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INTRODUCTION 
The West Asian political system presents two 
fundamental contradictions: One is based on the clash of 
two civilizations, the Jewish and the Islamic and the 
other in intra-Arab relationship. 
The region has been a very turbulent and 
volatile due to the continuous existence of Arab Israel 
conflicts; particularly Palestine-Israel conflict. The 
State of Israel even before coming into being in 1948 has 
been a source of strategic instability in the region. 
The recent development in the West-Asia, on 
going Palestinian uprising, large-scale Soviet Jewish 
immigration into - Israel, water disputes, the disinteg-
ration of Soviet Union, and its impact on Arab-Israel 
conflict, the Gulf War .... all these have given to the 
security of Israel as well as the security of Arab States 
a new dimension. 
The study is divided into six chapters including 
conclusion. 
11 
The first chapter of the study deals with the 
conceptual framework of Israel's National Security. The 
aim of this chapter is to analysis the security percep-
tions of Israel in relation to its bordering States. 
The chapter II deals With Israel's military capabilities, 
Israel nuclear policy, Israel's military connections and 
Israel's arm industry. The third chapter deals with the 
role of Israeli neighbouring States namely Jordan, Syria 
and Iraq in the Arab-Israeli conflict and peace process. 
It also focusses on the Israeli perception of threat 
from these countries. Fourth chapter deals with the 
role of the P.L.O. in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 
addition, the chapter also analysis the situation of 
Palestinian in the occupied territories. Fifth chapter 
focusses on the Israel-U.S. special relations. The 
concluding section brings together the various issues 
raised in the context of security of Israel, consequently 
leading the strategic instability in West Asia. 
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CHAPTER I 
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF ISRAEL'S 
NATIONAL SECURITY 
The Concept of Security 
Security is the central problem of the Israel's 
existence, from the beginning of the State, the Israel's 
thinking has been clear about the importance of security 
and its centrality. All appearance of life in Israel 
directly or indirectly relate to national survival and 
security. David Ben Gurion had said, "the security of 
Israel is not a matter of protection, the independence, 
territory, borders or sovereignty but it is matter of 
survival". Israelis are worried about their security 
which covers the whole spectrum of what is defined as 
protecting the national interest. Shimon Peres the former 
Prime Minister has defined security of Israel: "The Israeli 
security implies immigration, and' it means settlement. 
Security includes control of the sea and the air... Security 
Ghazi I. Rababah, The Israeli Security: 1864-1980 
Almanar, Zarka, Jordan, 1984, (Arabic), p.410 
is the development of scientific research and scientific 
aptitude in all disciplines, physic, chemistry, biology 
and advanced technology. The security of Israel is the 
mobilization of our youth and the involvement of the people 
and its scholar in the pursuit of difficult and vital 
objectives. Settlement, defense and integration of the 
exiles. Security is not a limited function but a multiple 
effort, it is like a high-tension cable, coricentrating na-
tional eneT;gy and using i t to reinforce the nation's ability to 
survive. It is both existing energy and potential 
energy." "The Israeli governments have placed Israel 
security before everything else, even before peace. Israel 
believes that security without peace was peace but peace 
3 
without security was no peace at all." 
According to most Israelis the term "security" in 
its absolute sense includes economic, legal and political 
4 
concern. Some Israelis define it as requiring the 
preservation of both Jewish and domestic character of the 
2. Yoram Peri, Between Battle Ballots : Israeli 
Military in Politics-, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, London, 1983, p.24. 
3. Xu Shan-nan, The Reagan Administration, Middle East 
Policy, Survival, Vol. XXVI, No.3, May/June 
1984, p . r n r 
4. John Edwin Morz, Beyond Security: Private Percep-
tion among Arab and Israelis" Pergmon Press, 
New York, 1980, p.105. 
state.^ Martino Van Greveld has said that Israel's 
security has two meanings: "first, the ability of indivi-
dual Israeli citizens to work, travel and sleep without 
being bombed by terrorist or shelled from across the 
border. Second, security means dealing with the perceived 
threat to Israel's existence as a state and as a nation." 
Israelis think that the concept of comprehensive 
security would help them in their struggle with their 
enemies. Within Israel the beginning of security is a 
result of the perception of military threat. It is clear 
that, the survival of the Jewish state is the undisputed 
goal shared by the whole nation, the uniformity of the goal 
prevents segmented attention to internal and external 
threats. "The choice of instruments to achieve the goal is 
often subjected to heated political and bureaucratic 
debates." 
5. Memil A. Mepeak, Israel: Border and Security 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54, No.3, April 1976, 
p. 432. 
6. Martin V. Greveld, The Making of Israel's Security 
in Stephanie G. Neuman, (ed.). Defense 
Planning in Less industrialized States, 
Lexington Book, Toranto, 1984, p.115. 
7. Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, Legitimacy integ-
ration and policy capacity, in Edward E.A. 
and C Moon, (ed.). National Security in the 
Third World: The Management of Internal and 
External threats, Centre for international 
development and conflict management. Univer-
sity of Maryland, 1988, pp. 93-94. 
"The council for peace and security" was 
established in March 1988 by the several retired Israeli 
generals headed by Aharon Yarive, former chief of military 
intelligence, which declared that "Israel's security 
depended upon its armed forces and not upon the occupied 
g 
territories." 
Both on the physical plan and in the value sphere 
the centrality of security dictated a stringent military 
and political concept of national defense and made security 
a vitually important factor in the political system. 
Therefore, national security is perceived as a central 
value and decisive factor in shaping of Israel's foreign 
policy to become an extension of national defense policy. 
Moshe Dayan said, "small nations do not have foreign 
9 
policy; they have defense policy." 
Individually and collectively Israelis believes 
that Arab goal would not only annihilate the state as a 
political entity but also destroy their population. 
Israeli knows that Arab would never agree to Israel's 
existence, and Israeli security has always been based on 
8. Jonathan Marcus,The Politics of Israel's Security, 
International Affairs, Vol. 65, No.2, Pring 
1989, p. 235. 
9. Peri, TU2, p.20. 
"a worse case analysis" maintaining that Israel cannot 
afford to take the risk, of loosing war because military 
defeat of Israel would mean the physical elimination of the 
Jewish State, "Israel cannot afford to lose a single war 
as to lose a single war is to lose every thing and this is 
the most and stark fact." Ben Gurion has stated: "Israel 
may win a hundred battles, yet its problems will not be 
solved but if the Aras are victorious only once as it will 
A 1.11 
mean our end." 
The people of Israel were entirely given over the 
deep sorrow and anxity for their men who lost their lives, 
and who were prisoners and wounded in 1973 war. Therefore, 
a psycological disaster and Israeli public faith in the 
12 labour leadership was disturbed. Thus, the Israeli 
national security is as much as psychological concept as it 
is a physical one. The Israeli security will continue to 
be linked with the military capabilities of the Arabs. In 
10. Yigal Allon, Israel : The Case of Defensible Border, 
Foreign Affairs, Vol.55, No.l, October 1976, 
p. 39. 
11. Moshe Dayan, Story of my life, William Morrow and 
Company Inc., New York, 1976, p.441. 
12. Uri Bialer, Thinking and Unthinkable: The possibi-
lities and implications of strategic bombing 
against Israel in the next war. The RUSI 
Journal, Vol. 122, No.4, December 1977, 
pp. 68-69. 
1956 Israel attacked Egypt in the name of prevention and in 
the 1967 Egypt, Syria and Jordan in the name of pre-
emption. In 1967 war Israel justified its expansion and 
occupation by removing hostile forces and taking control of 
the strategic cliff overlooking Jordan Valley. The 
security of Israeli civilian life is the issue and Israel 
is to thrust its civilian line forward across the Golan 
Heights and nearer the Syrian military line, on the protext 
of peace for Galilee, their northern settlement Israel 
14 
occupied in southern lebanon in 1982. 
The expansionist character of Israel was clear on 
July 30, 1980, when the Israeli parliament proclaimed that 
Jerusalem is the permanent capital, in a challenge to the 
entire world. To desire earnestly to restore the biblical 
boundaries Israeli expansionist aims are thus presented as 
a religious crusade, and are suspected that Israel has 
aspiration beyond the Palestine territory. Israel aspires 
to establish a Jewish State not only in Palestine but 
also from the Nile (Egypt) to Euphrates (Iraq) and Israel 
13. Walid Khalidi, Critique of the Middle East: Imposed 
Solution or Imposed Problems, in Gabrial 
Sheffer, (ed.), Great Power Intervention in 
the Middle East, Pergaman Press, New York, 
1979, p.289. 
14. Ibid., p. 287. 
hopes to find the opportunity. Moshe Shapira Israel's 
immigration Minister, admitted that without Jerusalem, 
Israel is an amputated state. "True Israel agreed to be a 
state without Jerusalem in 1947 but it merely waited until 
opportunity arose to rectify the situation." Menahem 
Begin admitted before Israeli soldiers 15 year later that 
"Egyptian troops concentrations in Sinai in May 1967 did 
not prove that Naseer was really about to attack us we 
must be honest with overselves, we decided to attack 
u • ,.16 
him . " 
Lebanese fear of Israeli annexation of south of the 
Litani river became known on several occasions, Mordechai 
Eliyahu, Chief Rabbi of Israel has stated: "Without doubts, 
southern Lebanon is part of the land of our forefather. 
Tyre, like part Sidon, is our forefather's land one need 
only take a look at a map showing a tribal division to see 
17 for one's self." 
15. Donald Neff, Israel slowly obsorbs Jerusalem, 
Saudi Gazettee (Saudi Arabia), 12 April 1988, 
p.6. 
16. Punyapria Dasgupta, Cheated by the World: The 
Palestine Experience, Orient Longman, New 
Delhi, 1988, p. 154. 
17. Palestine, (Cyprus), 15 October 1983, p.15. 
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Border 
The Israeli leaders always ignored the border and 
avoid at a definite conclusion about the demarcation of 
their respective territories. The former Israeli Prime 
Minister Golda Meir once states that "the frontier is where 
the Jews live and not where there is a line on the 
18 
map." The Israelis claimed that a considerable part of 
the armistic line that existed until June 4, 1967 are 
without any topographical security value and of less 
importance to Israel with the essential minimum of 
19 
strategic depth. Israel is looking for a border with 
strategic significance that would provide it with requisite 
minimal strategic depth. According to Israel's "Bible" 
the Lord of Israelis", The Lord of Israel is God of the 
Hills but he is not God of the Valleys" (I.Kings 20:28).^^ 
Israelis believe that the border is not secured by treaty 
or guarantee but rather one that is secured in itself. 
Golda Meir once emphasized". There is no guarantee of our 
security by others but physical conditions and boundaries 
18. News Week, 2 January 1989, p.12. 
19. Allon, _n^  10, p.41. 
20. Shimon Peres, David's Sling, Deidenfeld and 
Nicolson, London, 1970, p.222. 
21 
created in this country which will guarantee us. The 
discussion about the security guarantee is more complex 
than the discussion about borders. The new Zionist school 
of thought believes that more the territory under the 
Israeli control, the more Jewish and the more Zionist the 
state would be. On the other hand for labour and the peace 
movement the greater the territory under Israeli control 
and less Zionist the state will be because of the presence 
22 
of the Arabs. The Israeli concept of security revolves 
around the following elements : 
1. Keeping the occupied territories 
2. Large-scale immigration 
3. Establishing new settlements 
4. Military superiority 
5. Nuclear capability 
6. Continuing access to modern arms and economic 
assistance from the United State-
Keeping the Occupied Territories 
The occupied territories have formed a major 
element in the concept of Israeli security after the June 
21. Harry B. Ellis, The Dilemma of Israel: U.S. 
Interests in the Middle EasT^ American enter-
prise Institute for Public Policy Research, 
Washington, 1970, p.4. 
22. David Mc Dowall, Palestine and Israel: The Uprising 
and Beyond, I.B. Tauris and Co., London,1989, 
p.251. 
10 
War, and they provide a strategic buffer to sacrifice 
23 territory to absorb an Arab attack. 
The reason why Israel saved the 1973 war, was that 
Arabs had been at a distance when began and there was a 
sufficient time for to Israel to stop the attack on the 
several fronts. The Israeli leaders believe that the 
occupied territories are of the decisive geomilitary asset 
for the security of Israel. This led to the massive Jewish 
settlement in the occupied territories and extension of 
Israeli rule over them,. West Bank provide a major training 
area for the Israeli defense. It is also a major asset in 
24 dealing with the problems of infiltration operations. 
Large-scale Immigration 
Immigration was a most important and necessary for 
the growth and strengthening of Palestine Jewish community 
for the prosperity of the country and the building of the 
Jewish national home. The Jewish leaders believed that the 
Jewish state should become the Jews' home land who were 
23. Marianhe U. Beuwau, Israel,in Harold Muller,(ed.) , 
A Europena Non-Proliferation'Policy: Prospects 
and Problems, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987, 
p. 240. 
24. M.S. Heller, A Palestine State: The Implications 
for Israel^ Harvard Univ. pfess^ Harvard, 
1983, p. 15. 
11 
dispersed across the world. Infact it may be noted that 
without Jewish immigration Israel could never have come to 
exist when Israel came to existence, a new law was passed 
in 1950, according to which every Jews who arrived from 
outside was automatically an Israeli citizen. "The human 
resources are regarded as one of the important resources in 
> 
the balance of power between Jews and Arabs in general and 
25 between the Jews and Palestinian in particular." A person 
leaving Israel means weakening of Israel. Moshe Dayan 
quoted Ben-Gurion as frequently saying; "Our main objective 
is immigration, we have to do every thing possible to 
increase it and to attract immigrants from western 
countries in particular. The strength of the Jewish people 
lies in quality not quantity. And only if we raise our 
quality will be able to stand up to our numberless 
1,26 
enemies. 
Israel adopted the policy of unlimited immigration. 
Israel Prime Minister Shamir has stated that "Israel must 
25. The Jewish Exodus from the Arab Countries and the 
Refugee^ Israel Ministry for foreign affairs, 
information Division, Jerusalem, 1961, 
pp. 6-12. 
26. Saad Elshazly, The Arab Military Option, American 
Mideast Research, San Franciseo, 1986, p.60. 
12 
continue to give top priority to attracting Jews from all 
over the world that is the essence of the Zionist 
27 dream." Israel believed that the Israeli security 
depended on the modern arms from the west and large scale 
immigration and they also believed that if there are five 
or six or more million Jews in Israel nobody would be able 
to hurt their state its existence. The Jewish immigration 
in Palestine is most dangerous to the Palestinian economic, 
social, religious and political existence. Soviet 
Jewish immigration into Israel threatens to change the 
geography of the occupied territories. 
Establishing New Settlements 
Israel established new settlements at various 
strategically important places before Israel came into 
existence and provided there as well as the older 
settlements with trained men andsome military equipment. 
These were to play a decisive role in enabling the Israelis 
28 to win the 1948 War. After Israel came into existence the 
27. Yitzhak Shamir, Israel at 40: Working Back, Looking 
Ahead, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 3, 
1987/88, p. 381. 5ei~ also Y. Harkabi, Arab 
Attitudes to Israel, Keter Publishing House, 
Jerusalem, 1972, pp. 78-79. 
28. Fred J. Khouri, The Arab Israeli Dilemma,Syracause 
University Press, New York, 1968, p.73. 
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main principle of Israeli settlement policy has been to 
establish settlements first along the border. There are 
two attitudes on the question of settlements to the Israeli 
security. One maintains that settlements are primarily of 
political value that determine the border of the state. 
David Ben Gurion has stated that "Border settlements have 
fulfilled and will continue to fulfill an important role in 
the defense of Israel and it is incumbent on us to prepare 
a chain of settlements across the length and breadth of the 
29 
country." It is clear that the settlements in West Bank 
and Ghaza District have a political purpose. They would 
also break up the contact and encircle the density 
populated Arab areas situated along the West Bank's water 
shed. The main object of these settlements is to make 
solid option for Israeli annexation of at least part of the 
30 VJest Bank. The followers of the demography-security 
approach support the establishment of a large number of 
29. Aryeh Shalev, The West Bank: Line of Defence, 
Praeger, New York, 1985, p.84. 
30. Avi Plascov, A Palestine State: Examining the 
alternatives, in Charles Tripp, (ed.) 
Regional Security in the Middle East, Gower, 
London, 1984, pp. 59-60. 
Jewish settlement that would be scattered throughout the 
West Bank. This kind of settlements would be better to 
held out against a military threat and could be organized 
31 into a regional-defense district. David Ben Gurion noted 
that "Our manner of settlements will be no less than 
methods by which we built the army,. Only dense 
agricultural settlement along the border .... will serve as 
a very reliable shield for the security of Israel against 
attacks from the outside.... A wall of working and 
productive human being is capable of watching over the 
32 
nation's borders." In the opinion of Moshe Dayan "Settle 
ment has an important and significant value in the creation 
of political facts."-^ -^  . 
31. Shalev, n.29, p.88. The World Zionist organization 
master plan which was finalised in 1981, 
known as the Drobless Plan after its another 
the head of WZO's settlement division stated 
that "there is to be not a shadow of doubt 
regarding our intention to remain in Judea 
and Samaria a dense chain of settlements on 
the mountain ridge running south wards from 
Nablus to Hibron will serve as a reliable 
barrier on the Eastern front. This buffer 
Zone of s^ ettlements will also create security 
for settlers in the Jordan Valley. Both area 
between concentrations of the minority (Arab) 
population and the area minimise the danger 
of rise of another Arab state in the region". 
See Rami, S. Abdulhadi, Land Use Planning in 
the occupied Palestinian territories, Journal 
of Palestine Studies, Vol. XIX, No.4, 1990, 
p. 48. 
32. Ibid., p. 168 
33. Ibid., p. 169; 
15 
Israeli settlements and their effort to change the 
character of the occupied territories are based on their 
claim that Judea and Samaria are the biblical Land of Ertz 
Israel. The religious claims have played a much more 
34 
dominant role in the approach to West Bank and the 
formulation of Israel's settlement policy. 
The settlement and security have been inseparable 
for Israel since the first settlers moved into the West 
Bank in September 1967. This has made Israel use the 
policy of "Settlement for Security and Security for 
Israel". These settlements serve Israel's military 
security interest and since 1973 settlement defenses have 
been greatly strengthened. Israeli defense field are now 
quite massive constructions with five position dug into 
artificial mounds created to improve fields of fire and 
observation. Israeli settlements and the settlers are 
probably armed with machine guns, mortars and anti-tank 
35 
weapons. 
34. Adam Robers, Decline of Illusions: The Status of 
the Israeli occupied territories, Inter-
national Affairs, Vol. 64, No.3, Summerl988, 
p. 351. > 
35. A.S. Duncan, Israeli Settlements and Security, The 
RUSI Journal, Vol. 127, No.l, March 1M2T 
p~. 52, See also Anees Saiq, New Israeli 
Settlements, Palestine Research Centre, 
Beirut, 1968 (Arabic). 
16 
The settlements also maintain substantial stock of 
infantry and anti-tank Weapons. Israeli agriculture 
Minister Areil Sharon said "every settlement has its 
'\f\ 
purpose and role in the defence of Israel." The Jewish 
settlements in borders areas play an active role in 
Israel's defense and can provide a kind of early warning 
and in war time play a role in static defence. An Israeli 
military officer has stated that "these settlements have 
enabled Israel to seal off its borders from Arab attacks 
and provide Israel with up-front units which can be quickly 
37 integrated into the security plans for the area." 
Hence the Jewish settlements create some powerful 
obstruction to military action by the Arabs to regain their 
land. They also represent a powerful bargaining group in 
any peace negotiation as well as very influential lobby 
inside Israel which cannot easily be ignored. 
The settlement organisation on the West Bank 
believe in their religious duty to settle what they see as 
the historic homeland of Judaism. In Golan, it may be 
36. Mark A. Heller, A Palestinian State: The Implica-
tions for Israel, Harvard University Press, 
Harvard, 1983, p. 112. 
37. Morz, n.4, p. 114. 
38. Moha mmed S. Almord, The Role of Settment in 
Israeli Security, Al-Hadaf, No.1001, 1 April 
1990, Damascus, pp. 18-21.(Arabic) 
17 
negotiable in return for peace with Syria. And in Gaza 
Strip, there may be some chance that settlement, would be 
forfeited in Sinai. On the other hand the West Bank is 
unlikely to be returned to Jordan or the PLO because the 
pattern of Israeli settlements there makes any kind of 
39 political partition extremely difficult to implement. 
Military Superiority 
Israeli leaders believe that continued existence of 
Israel depends on its military superiority. A senior 
government official stated, "Our security rests in our 
superiority." Therefore, Israelis believe that Isral 
will survive as long as it is strong." Military becomes 
the centre of survival and solidarity in Israel. In 1948 
Prime Minister and Minister of Defence David Ben-Gurion 
declared that the Haganah (an underground military organi-
sation established in 1920) had shed its clandestine 
character and would Hither to become the official army of 
the state of Israel. The official name of the Haganah was 
changed as "Zeva Haganable-Israel," Israel Defence Forces 
39. Peter Beaumon, Gerald H. Blake and J. Matcolm 
Wagstaff, The Middle East: A Geographical 
Study, Second Edition, David Futon, London, 
1988, p. 457. 
40. Morz, n.4, p. 117. 
18 
(IDF). In April 1948 the Haganah repulsed Iraqi, Syrian, 
and Arab armies and captured Tiberias and Jaffa. Thus 
Haganah was responsible for the military survival of the 
Jewish State. 
Israel maintains one of the world's most 
professional armies and has a high status in Israel's 
society. Ben Gurion has stated that "the IDF is the only 
body in the nation which is beyond debate which does not 
have divisions and contradictions....which is free from the 
malgnancy of fissures and fragmentation which the nation of 
Israel inherited".^^ 
He tried to' make the army a symbol of 
identification and glorification of a supreme value. He 
also claimed that is an innocent society the military can 
be and our army must be an educational instrument that 
should be improved and made strong. The army cannot 
fulfill its mission within Israel or outside world, without 
any proper military direction. The centrality of 
41. Peri, n_^, p. 43. 
42. Peri, n. 2, p. 43. 
43. Ibid., p. 44. 
19 
security, the Ministry of Defence has the status of super-
ministry in Israel. 
The administration of the.occupied territories was 
assumed by the ministry of defense, after the June war, and 
the autonomy of the defence ministry became more 
significant than those' of other ministries. By 1967 the 
fully mobilized army numbered over 250,000 (Some 11 to 12 
per cent of the population). About 601 of Israel financial 
resources both domestic and foreign were being channeled to 
its security forces. The Tax payer pays for 70% of 
Israel defense outlays which comes to about 15 billion out 
of 7 billion. This portion is considerably higher than the 
percentage that NATO citizens spend on their own 
defence. Israel is the most militarized nation in the 
world as it spends 30% of its gross national product on 
defence. 
This concept of security devotes all the resources 
to war preparation. The Israelis believe in the ancient 
aphorism "who wishes for peace prepares for war", which 
44. Ibid., p. 194. 
45. Maharashtra Herald, 1 November 1988, p.4. 
46. Shamir, n. 27, p.588. 
explain why Israel would have to maintain large standing 
army. Israel has maintained a high degree of manpower 
mobilization for national security. This has to enabled 
Israel to become a regional military power. Resources 
played a dominant role in Israel's wartime efforts 
reserves participation constitute an important part of 
47 Israel's wartime military strength. 
Israel remains the world's most efficiently 
mobilized society. The strength of its army is consis-
tently growing Israel is capable of deploying substantial 
army as in the October 1973 war, Israeli formation took 
less than 48 hours to disengage from the Suez front and 
reinforce at the Golan front in an emergency. Since the 
1974 IDF has been conscripting over 90% of all males. 
Another factor is the extension of the period of 
compulsory services and this happened three time during 
thirty years. 
An Israeli women serves less time than men, two 
year instead of three, in the IDF and few of them do 
reserve duty unlike men. Former chief of Yigael Yadin has 
47. Dan Horowitz, Strategic Limilations of a nation in 
Arms Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 13, 
No. 3,' Military Institutions, Arab Research 
and Studies Institute, Cairo, 1977, (Arabic) 
48. Peri, n. 2 , p.22. 
21 
stated "the Israeli citizen is a soldier on eleven months 
49 
annual leave". 
The Airforce and Armour represent 807o of Israel's 
military strength. The Israeli airforce one of the 
country's most important deterrents has always been a 
highly technical organisation and has become even more 
sophisticated in a process stimulated by the demanding 
requirements of defence problems. 
The Israeli strategy was based on aerial attack as 
the main defense.Its Air force protected Israel's territory 
from the raiding Arab aircraft and provided air umbrella 
under which Israel's ground forces qperated freely. Israeli 
superiority in the air was the key to its swift victory on 
land. Thus the IDF building emphasizes on the air force 
49. Ibid., p. 24. See also Mefored Spio, Children of 
the Kibbutz, Schochen Book, New York, the 
Third Printing, 1967, p.52. 
50. E.N. Luttarak, Commentary Defence Planning in 
Israel: A Brief Retrospective, n. Stepharie 
G. Neuman, (ed.). Defense Planning in less 
Industrial States, Lexigton Books, Torando, 
1984, p. 143. See also Haithem Al Kilani, 
Israeli Military Doctrine, Palestine Research 
centre, Beirut, 1969, TArabic) 
51. Edger Oballawee, The Third Arab Israeli War, Faber 
and Faber, London, 1972, p.54. 
22 
due to its operational flexibility and its vital role both 
in determine and in determining the outcome of a war. 
The concept of pre-emptive war and retaliatory 
strikes became essential ingredients of Israeli military 
policy following Prime Minister David Ben Gurion's concept 
52 
of carrying the war into the enemy's territory. Israel 
was the first state to develop a official policy of 
retaliation. From 1951 the Israeli government had ordered 
reprisal raids. These reprisal operations clearly 
indicated expansion and aggressive character of Israel. 
Israeli believes that the doctrine of pre-emptive 
retaliation is a way to protect Israel and punish anyone 
who attempt to inflict harm upon. Therefore, the Israeli 
have made clear that they would launch pre-emptive raids 
against anyone if Israel felt that its security is being 
threatened. Yossi Ben Ahaven the Director General of the 
Prime Minister's office has stated "Israel has acquired a 
reputation of not waiting until a potential danger becomes 
53 
an actual danger." Israel's military strategy had been 
based upon making full use of the element of surprise. 
Striking the Arabs before they become unified and powerful, 
52. Morz, n. 4 , p.114. 
53. Time, 11 April 1988, p.19. 
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taking the initiative in order to achieve a quick victory 
and concentrate as much power as possible. 
A key stone of Israel's security doctrine pres-
cribes waging a short and a decisive war, short because 
Israeli society and economy can not afford long war and 
decisive because Israel can not afford defeat at the hands 
of the Arab. Israel's security doctrine for achieving 
these objective aims at prompt transfer of the battle to 
the Arab territory, this could be achieved by fostering 
maneuverability and offensive capabilities. Therefore, 
the Israeli objective is to win a war with the minimum 
losses among civilian and military. Israel has one of the 
most developed programme for civil defence against 
different type of war in future; for instance, "in October 
1987 Israel organized a nation wide civil defence exercise 
in which school children were shown how to use gas-mask and 
take other elementary precautions against a chemical war-
fare attack. 
"The Israeli military doctrine has taken from the 
Bible which consider a religious duty ....the soldier of 
54. Aharon Levran, The Military Balance in ME, in A. 
Levran, (ed.). The Middle East Military 
Balance 1986, Jerusalem Post, Jerusalem,198/, 
pp. 84-8.5. 
55. Armed forces, Vol. 7, No.4, April 1988, p. 156. 
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Israel are the soldier of God and their wars are his ..." 
The Israeli soldiers are respected inside and outside 
Israel. In November 1982 PLO exchanged six Israeli 
prisioners soldier for 4400 Palestinians and Lebanese 
detained by Israel. 
In Israel not only army is entrusted with carrying 
out security but the civilian institutions also share the 
responsibility for maintaining security. Ben Gurion stated 
that "The security ' mission would not be performed 
exclusively by the army. Without settlement, without 
industry, without the education of the nation, without 
sympathy from other nations not even the army itself will 
58 
secure the peace of the nation." 
The Prime Minister is the final arbiter in the 
matter of defense policy. The state's security has always 
rested in the hands of a small group within the cabinet: 
sometime two or three other minister selected by the Prime 
59 Minister on the basis of their political power. 
56. General of Israel, Hader Publishing House, Tel Aviv 
1986, p.151. 
57. Edger Oballance, Arafat and the PLO, The RUSI 
Journal, Vol. 1, No.129, March 1984, p.52. 
58. Peri, xu 2 , pp. 42-43. 
59. M.V.Greveld, The making of Israel's Security, in 
Stepharie G. Neuman, (ed.) Defense Planning 
in less Industrial States, 1 Lexigton Books, 
Torando, 1984, pp.122. 
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The chief of staff established a national security 
planning system within the General staff branch in 1969, 
which deals not only with the military aspect but also with 
the broader range of national interest, including the 
political and economic aspect of security. Moshe Dayan the 
Defense Minister of Israel wanted to establish a unit for 
national security planning with in the civilian ministry of 
Defense. And his planning aimed at taking this wider 
function out of the hands of the army but consequently the 
responsibility for national security planning remained in 
the General Staff Branch. National Security Planning 
System within General Staff Branch was responsible for 
preparing plans for the developments of the IDF, working 
out methods for ascertaining and studying wide security 
needs, and carrying out research projects by experts in the 
concerned field. 
Thus the Israeli national security aims at the 
strengthening and development of the IDF, the development 
of broad security structure for Israel, the integration of 
Israel's resources to meet security needs, the development 
of security connection with other countries (especially the 
60. Avraham, Tamir, A Soldier in Search of Peace: a 
Inside, Look at Israel's Strategy, Weiden-
field anjd Nicolson, London, ' 1988, p.233. 
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U.S.) and political agreement with the Arab States. 
There is no commander-in-chief in Israel's army, 
and IDF is headed by the Defense Minister and Chief of 
staff. The Ground forces command, a new headquarter was 
formed in 1983 to meet the increasing complexity of 
warfare, the need for complete integration in training and 
administration of all branches of the ground forces. 
The IDF increased the number of tanks by 50%, 
> 
artillery by 1007o and armoured personel carrier fleet by 
8007o in recent years, and in the occupied territories the 
border troops have been used as a para military forces in 
case of civil unrest. 
Nuclear Capability 
Nuclear deterrance adopted by Israel as an ingre-
dient of her security perception. In the Middle East 
Israel is the only state, seriously suspected of having 
created nuclear weapons of some sort or other. Israel 
claims that it would soon move to the stage of nuclear 
confrontation with its Arab adversaries. Moshe Dayan said 
in an interview on 26 August 1976 that "Israel must have a 
61. Ibid., pp. 235-236. 
62. M. Urban, Fire in the Galilee Part 1: Israel Armed 
Forces, Vol. 5, No.4, April 1986,pp. 169-170 
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nuclear option." At the same time Israel believes that 
Israeli nuclear capability would stabilized the Middle 
East. 
The introduction of nuclear weapons into the 
Israeli arsenal will give the Israeli public a sufficient 
feeling of security. Israel's atomic energy programme 
intended to cover within its system of blanket its security 
also. In July 1981, when Israel conducted the world's 
first pre-emptive strike against Iraqi nuclear reactor, the 
operation's purpose was to prevent any Arab state in the 
area from constructing nulcear reactors. 
Continuing Access to Modern Arms and Economic 
Assistance from the United States 
Israeli economy is still beset by the massive 
problem that emerged in the wake of 1973,war, and security 
of Israel remained insecure. Israel has managed to cope 
with the world's highest inflation rate. Israel would 
face serious problem on both economic and military procure-
ment fronts without U.S. aid. Through financial support, 
US causes about 50% of the Israeli defence budget but even 
without financial support Israeli relies heavily as the 
63. Galal Elrashidi, The Arabs and the World of the 
Seventies, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 
1977, p.m. 
64. L. Beaton and J. Modex, The Spread of Nuclear 
Weapons, Chatto and King, London, 1962, p.171 
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transfer of major American weapon systems. 
For sometime the need for a powerful outside backer 
had recognized by Israeli leaders. As Menachen Begin 
recalled Ben Gurion used to say that it is vital to have a 
great power behind you if you are pursuing a policy that 
may lead to war. 
Since the establishment of the state, the security 
of Israel have been central theme of U.S. policy. The U.S. 
has maintained to provide support and keeping Israel 
stronger than any individual or as group of its Arab 
neighbours. 
According to point of view of U.S. an Israeli 
security is that "Israel should maintain military 
superiority over its Arab neighbours, the Arab changing 
their statusquo by force to help to prevent this 
superiority. Israel now maintains the strongest military 
65. Yair, Evron, Israel and Nuclear Weapons, in Jae Kye 
Park, (ed.). Nuclear Proliferation in Devel-
oping Countries, Kyungnam University, Korea, 
1979, p.133. 
66. McDowall, n. 22, p.45. 
67. John C. Campbell, Middle East Oil: American Policy 
and Super Power Interaction, Survival, 
Vol. XV, No.5, September/October 1973, p.215. 
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in the region^The prospects for survival of Israel will not 
depend upon power alone but on a change in her attitude of 
superiority and on a lasting reconciliation with the Arab. 
There can be no security for Israel until there is security 
for the whole Middle East region. 
In sum, Israel has managed its security affairs 
from a perceived sense of vulnerability in the 40 years. 
Israel came to existence in 1948 and led to the first 
Arab-Israeli confrontation, and later there were wars again 
in 1967, 1973 and in Lebanon in 1982 These wars further 
entrenched Israeli power in the region and also allowed to 
expand in the name of security. These territorial 
expansions are enhancing Israel's security by increasing 
Arab in security. For instance, Israel has annexed the 
Golan Height, invaded Lebanon, daily violated the human 
rights of the Arab living in the occupied territories and 
also bombed the PLO headquarters in Tunisia. Thus, Israel's 
strength lies mostly in the physical military sense of 
power and Arab disunity because Arab unity in a direct 
threat to Israel that must be prevented. Despite deploy-
ment in the territories, attainment of strategic depth and 
the peace treaty with Egypt, the centrality of security of 
Israeli life remains undiminished. 
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CHAPTER II 
MILITARY / SECURITY ISSUE 
The Israeli Arms Industry 
Israel's arms industry had its beginning as early 
as 1933 when Palestine was under the British mandate, and 
its earliest task was to meet the territory's own military 
needs. In Israel, the actual process of defence industry 
development commenced only after the six day war although 
the clandestine small-scale arms and ammunition development 
took place even before the establishment of the state. 
The Israeli arms industry has grown rapidly since 
the October War 1973. It has also become a vital element 
of the Israeli economy. Arms sales have become a signifi-
cant Israeli diplomatic weapon. The states of Jewish state 
in the realm of international defense, security affairs, 
and conventional arms trade is of great importance to 
Israel. Meanwhile, the Israeli people think that military 
industrialization should be a direct response to hostile 
Arab intensification. Hence the "Parachuting" and rapid 
development of ex-military professionals into senior 
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industrial position are looked on with favour, as this 
would serve the country's security in a virtually perpetual 
military conflict with the Arab states. The military 
industry has gained considerable autonomy in its activius 
and decision to obtain efficiency and success. The argu-
ment of the military security is the counterpiece of 
Israeli arms export policy-serving atleast four defense 
function: 
1. The Israeli ar'my's immediate as well as long-range 
preparedness by extending local defense production 
and reducing the unit cost of local items, while 
reducing dependence on outside procurement or the 
threat of a supply cut off. 
2. The Israeli deterrent capability in the Arab eyes 
by an image of strength and world wide defense 
link. 
3. Fitting Israel, into a broader western strategic 
perspective, and 
2 
4. Israeli support for countries befriending. 
Alex, Mints, Military - Industrial Linkage in 
Israel, Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 12, 
No.l, Fall 1985, p.10. 
Aaron S. Klieman, Israel and the World After 40 
Years, Pergaman-Brassey's International 
Defense Publisher, New York, 1964. 
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The Israeli military industrial complex is a 
coalition of various institutions whose representative 
participate in a high-level national security policy making 
process. The components of the industrial complex share 
responsibility for various spheres of activity in ensuring 
3 
Israel's security. 
The core component of the Israeli military indus-
trial complex are : 
The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) 
The Intelligence branches (such as the Mossad) 
The Ministry of Defence 
The Defence Industries (both government owned 
industries and non-government enterprises) 
Political representative (See Table 1) 
Military Industries of Israel are based on a mixed 
ownership model, comprising government own corporations, 
Histadrut (the General Federation of Labour) Hevrat Haovdim 
owned companies as well as private concerns (there are 
apparently more than 100 private owned companies in Israel 
engaged primarily in military function). 
Alex Mintz, The Military-Industrial Complex: The 
Israeli 'case, in Moshe Lissak, (ed.), Israeli 
Society and its Defense Establishment: The 
Social and Political Impact of a Protracted 
Violent Conflict, Frank Cass, London, 1984, 
p. 107. 
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TABLE 1 
Israel's Military - Industrial Sector 
1. Government corporations and their subsdiaries: 
e.g. Israel Air craft Industries, Beit Shemesh 
Elta, Ashot Askelon. 
2. Defense Ministry Ancillary Units: The Military 
Industry (TAAS) Rafael. 
3. IDF Manufacturing: Primarily through the ordinance 
corps. 
4. Labor federation (Hevrate Haovdim Corporations): 
Primarily those of the koor concern, such as 
Tadirau, Solta^, Koor Metels, Velcan foundries. 
5. Privately owned (Israeli or International) 
Companies: e.g., Eagle, Elisra, Motorola, etc. 
6. Defense Sector investment Companies: such as CLal, 
Discount Bank Investments. 
7. Companies supplying Non-Defence Product and 
Services to the Defence Sector. 
Source: Alex, Mintz, Military - Industrial Linkages in 
Israel, Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 12, No.l, 
Fall 1985, p.11. 
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Israeli military Industries are responsible for 
military research, development and manufacture and also a 
sub system of defense establishment. "This sub-system 
primarily Includes ancillary units of the Defense Ministry 
and bodies under Its direct control such as the Ministry of 
Industry, Israel Air craft Industries and the Armaments 
4 
Development Authority (RAFAEL)". The administrative and 
economic management of Israeli security system Is exercised 
through the Ministry of Defence. In Israel the management 
of manufacture and procurement of weapons system is carried 
out through the Ministry's procurement and production 
administration, which has separate divisions responsible 
for aerial ground and naval forces. Production adminis-
tration and the province of the Armaments Research is 
jointly administered by Ministry of Defence and I.D.F. 
Research and development is implemented under the auspices 
of the Ministry of Defence Chief Scientist's Office. 
In Israel most military development and manufactur-
ing is carried out in units subjected to the direct or 
indirect control of the Ministry of Defence (Israel Air-
craft Industries, TAAS and RAFAEL). 
4. Ibid. , p. 114. 
5. Ibid., p. 115. 
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The Israel Military Industry (IMP 
TAAS :- In Israel TAAS is the pioneer defense Industry 
established in 1933, and about 14,500 persons are employed 
in 31 plants and units manufacturing weapons system and 
primarily ammunition. In 1980-81 the sales turn over 
$ 500 million including $ 300 million in exports. The best 
known amongs TAAS - developed products are the Uzi sub 
machine gun, the Galil assault rifle, Hetz tank ammnition 
and path-clearing bombs. 
RAFAEL :- It was founded in 1958 to replace the IDF since 
corps and its successor, The Division of Research and 
Planning, and this is the Israel's largest research and 
development institution with more than 500 employees. 
Shafrir 1, Shafrir 2 and Phythan 3 air-to-air missiles, a 
computer for firing control of artillery and other products 
are the major development of RAFAEL. 
RAMTA STRUCTURE AND SYSTEM :- This is an lAI subsidiary 
at Beersheba. The light armoured reconnaissance vehicles 
the RAMV-1 and RBYMK-1 and a 20 mm twin - barreled anti-
air-craft gun are manufactured by it. World's smallest 
missile craft is also designed and built by it, and Dvora 
class which is mainly for export. 
6. Saad Eshazly, The Arab Military Option, American 
Mideast Research, San Francisco, 1986, p. 37. 
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SOLTAM :- Soltam has developed a 155 mm self propelled 
gun/howitzer and is based at Haifa. This earlier version, 
the M-68, entered service in 1970, the Later model, the 
M-71 came in 1975. 
HAIFA SHIPYARDS :- On 19 February 1973 Haifa launched the 
Reshif, First of a new 450 ton SAAR-4 class, Fast-attack-
craft. Five were sent to Chile, and nine of these were 
built for South Africa. The Alia, first of a new 488 ton 
SAAR-5 class boat was launched on July 1980. This is 
sufficient to carry an anti-submarine helicopter. Tanks 
7 
and general purpose landing crafts are built by Haifa. 
Emphasising the theme of self-reliance Israel manufactures 
a broad spectrum of weapons from small 'arms to air-craft 
and missile. Since the mid-1970s5 Israel's imports of 
major weapons largely decreased as a result of Israel's 
rapidly growing domestic arms production capabilities. In 
the early 1980s the inflow of weapons consisted mainly of 
highly advanced Fighter air-craft and some types of 
warships coming mainly from the U.S.A. 
Israeli arms sales abroad were about $ 60 million 
a year before, the 197!3 war. To $ 600 million had shot up 
7. Ibid., p.38. 
8. Michael Brzoka and Thomas Ohlson, Arms Transfers to 
the Third World, 1971-85, Sipri, Oxford 
University Press, 1987, p.20. 
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by 1979 and it had reached $ 1300 million by 1981 consti-
tuting about 257o of its total industrial exports. About 
507c, of Israel's arms exports were bought by Latine American 
countries El-Salvador and Argentina being the largest 
consumers. The leading importer of Israeli arms in Africa 
9 
is South Africa. 
The arms industry is the backbone of the Israeli 
economy. It has been estimated that one third of the 
entire Israeli labour force now works on armaments. In the 
80's the South Africa followed by Argentina were the top 
customers and the other countries which bought arms from 
Israel include EL-Salvador, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia., Kenya, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Singapore and Taiwan. Israeli 
arms diplomacy is hardly confined to Israel over 40 other 
countries are reported to be engaged to varying degree in 
weapons transfers. Where other standard instrument of 
foreign policy do not work well, the instrument military 
aid provided opportunities to Israel to extend its 
influence in the Third World like other nations Israel also 
used arms sales and assistance as an effective instrument 
of its foreign policy to accomplish vital national 
interests. The decision of Ethiopia to open an embassy in 
Jerusalem the restoration of diplomatic relations between 
9. Aaron S. Klieman, Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales 
as Diplomacy" Pergamon-Brassy's International 
Publisher, New York, 1985, p.136 
10. Ibid., pp. 135-140. 
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Israel and Liberia as well as EL-Salvador are few examples 
11 
of Israeli accomplishments. To encourage the growth of 
what is commonly called science-based research and develop-
.mentlsrael established the Office of the Chief-Scientist in 
1970. About one third of Israel's industrial exports are 
science based today. The trade is worth about $1.3 billion 
12 * 
annually. So far about 600 Israeli companies are active 
in scientific R. and D. with about a hundred new companies 
appearing each year. In a population of three million in 
1980, Israel has well educated population of about 10,000 
scientist and 20,000 engineers. Electronics, chemical and 
biotechnology are the three industrial priorities in high-
13 technology field in Israel. Out of these three, the 
production of two industries was an important factor in 
Israel's past victorious over the Arabs, so Israel's 
industrial ambitions have obvious military significance. It 
must remain qualitatively superior to its Arab neighbours 
in men and equipment if Israel is to achieve its ambitions 
to enforce its will over the entire region. Israel 
11. The Independent, (Bombay), 23 November 1990, p.7. 
12. Elshazly, n.6, p.38. 
13. Ibid., p. 38. 
14. The Secrets of Israel's Arms Industry, Alitehad, 
(Abu Dhabi), 3 May 1987, p.20, 7 May 1987, 
p. 17. (Arabic) 
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launched its first photo-reconnaissance setelite in 
September 1988, which was supposed give it a considerable 
military and intelligence advantage over the Arab 
countries. 
It may be also pointed out that Israel is the 
seventh-largest arms exporters in the world. In this 
connection, Manes Danan, Deputy General Director of 
Israeli Military Industries has said, "We are selling to 
any country that the government is willing to sell to. If 
we have a choice we are looking for stable countries but we 
want to employ our people." An Israeli arms dealer 
expressed that "Just about anyone who shows any interest in 
1 fi buying arms from us can have them." 
Israel's Military Connections 
In January 1957 David Ben Gurion had said, "From 
the point of view of our existence and security, the 
friendship of one European country is more valuable than 
the views of all the people of Asia". Israeli leaders 
formulated a geographical survey strategy to deal with the 
15. Peter L. Bunce, The Growth of South Africa's 
Defense Industry and its Israeli Connection, 
RUSI Journal, Vol. 129, No.2, June 1984, p.45 
16. Ibid., p. 45. 
17. Benjamen B. Hallami, The Israeli Connections: Who 
Israel Arms and Why, Pantheon Books, New 
York, 1987, p.5. 
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emerging Arab decolonization around them in the 1950s. The 
idea of periphery plan was based on the Israel should 
create alliances with the non-Arab nations such as Turkey, 
Ethiopia and Iran on the periphery of Middle E^st Countries 
in order to out Flank the bordering Arab States. The 
strategy has called over the years for its ties with 
Phalangist in Lebanon, rebels in South Sudan and Kurds in 
Iraq. The strategy also called for encouraging non-Arab 
and non-Muslim minorities in the Middle East, among them 
the Lebanese, Maronities, the Druze and the Kurds to seek 
political independence in cooperation with Israel. In the 
Middle East these facts have become the basis of Israel's 
geo-strategy. 
Aril Sharon the then Defence Minister of Israel 
delivered a speech in person for an academic conference 
organised by the Tel Aviv University Centre for Strategic 
Studies in mid December 1981. He said that "We must expand 
the field of Israel strategic and security concerns in the 
eighties to include countries like Turkey, Iran, Pakistan 
and areas like the Persian Gulf and Africa and in 
19 particular the countries of North and Central Africa." 
18. Ibid. , p. 8. 
19. Avner Yanir, Deterrence Without Bomb: The Politics 
of Israeli Strategy, Lexington Books, D.C. 
Heath and Company, Toronto, 1987, p.213. 
See also Journal of Palestine Studies, 
Vol. XI, No.3, Spring, 1982, pp. l67-l72. 
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The military cooperation between Iran and Israel in 1950s 
was existensive and irtcluded both arms sales and training 
of Iranian officers in ground warfare, intelligence, 
counter intelligence and air warfare. In 1955 a permanent 
representative of Israeli Defense forces was sent to Tehran 
who later on officially became a military attache. Iran 
bought a large quantity of Uzi submarine guns in 1964. A 
small quantity of Iranian crude oil Israel begun to receive 
by 1953. By 1978, Israeli export to Iran including 
military equipment amounted to $ 225 million, 7% of total 
20 Israeli exports. 
The relationship between Iran and Israel was the 
best illustration of the fruits of quit diplomacy during 
the Shah era. It involved all four concerns: security, 
trade, political contacts and keeping a line open to 
Persian Jewry. Iran shared Israel's pre-occupation with 
militant Arab unity and it supplied Israel with oil coordi-
nated efforts in secret meeting with Israel leaders and 
the highest levels and pursued an elightened policy 
21 toward the Jews of Iran. 
20. R.B. Reppa, Israel and Iran, Praiger, New York, 
1974, pp. 240-249. 
21. K. Lieman, n.2, p.168. 
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25 years of friendship between Iran and Israel 
ended abruptly in 1979 with the ascension of the Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeni in Iran. In Iran, the Islamic regime 
demonstrated its commitment to Palestinians and regarded 
Israel as one of the Satans against whom an uncompromising 
war was to be waged. . In March 1949 Turkey offered Israel 
defacto recognition. Israel has helped Turkey in technical 
training for intelligence and security services. Israeli 
intelligence services have provided training for the 
Turkish secret services. The Turkish air-force has been 
acquiring Israeli made Shafrir air to air missile, and 
Ground force equipment since 1975. Israeli Hetz anti-tank 
Shells, Uzi submachine guns and ammunition were also 
purchased by Turkey. There have been various indications 
of renewed secret contacts between Israel and the Turkish 
regime, since the military coup of 1980. There have also 
22 been public contacts. Following the October war of 1973 
the Diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Israel got 
severed. The Diplomatic relation between these two 
countries were in November 1989 after an interruption of 
16 years. Currently in Ethiopia there are several hundred 
Israeli military advisors. Israel strategically needs an 
access to Ethiopia's long Red Sea Coast, and to obtain this 
22. Hallami, n. 17, pp. 16-17. 
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strategic advantage, it has aimed at having close relations 
with the Ethiopian regim. The only friendly ports on the 
Red Sea are the Eritrean ports of Mossawa and Assab which 
command the strategic position on the western shore of the 
Red Sea and at the northern approach to the Bab-Al-Mandeb 
Strait route linking through which Israel used to transport 
23 its crude oil supply from the Persian Gulf region. 
Eritrea's importance is that it lies along the whole 570 
mile Red Sea coastline between border with Sudan to the 
north and that with Djibouti to the South. It is a highly 
desirable piece of strategic territory.• In the point of 
view of Israel that Eritrian independent state could 
transform the Red Sea into an exclusively Arab lake, so 
they would like to prevent the establishment of an Eritrian 
independent State. Therefore, Israel is seeking to forge 
an alliance between Christian and Jews against Arabs. And 
on the other hand half of Eritians are Muslim and speak 
Arabic are the natural enemies of both Addes Ababa and 
24 Jerusalem. For that purpose the Israeli military 
personnel train Ethiopian soldier to fight counter 
insurgency warfare in Eritera and more conventional warfare 
23. Ethiopia and Israel, Durable links and a Historic 
Conflict, News brief, Vol. 10, No.6, June 
1990, Royal United Services Institute for 
Defence Studies, London, p.46. 
24. John Laffin, The Middle East: Old Game With New 
Rules, Rusi and Brassey's Defence Year Book, 
London, 1984, p.131. 
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in Ogadon. On the Ethiopian Red Sea coast, Israel had set 
up observation posts to monitor Arab and Soviet shipping 
through the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea. There 
were reports that in the Red Sea Israel was demanding a 
25 
military base on the Dhalak islands. Soviet support for 
Mongistu's Ethiopian regime was with draw in 1989. Israel 
attempted to export the Arab-Israeli conflict to the 
African region with the intention exacerbating. The Muslim 
and non-Muslim tensions already evident between neighbour-
ing countries in north Africa and with in the regimes 
themselves. 28 years Ethiopia's war with seperatists of 
Eritrea Tigray and Oromo is running out of steam and rebels 
supplied by Iraq and other Arab states have seized the 
strategic port of Massawa. Fragmentation bombs to the 
Ethiopian army has been supplied by Israel, and they were 
reportedly used to bomb Massawa horbour, now in the hands 
of Eritrean rebels. Through Chilean arms manufacturer 
Industries cardoin the Israel had financed the sale of the 
fragmentation or cluster bomb. Israel is anxious to 
accelerate the immigration of thousand of Ethiopian Jews 
is to Israel after the re-establishing diplomatic relation 
between the two countries. In the mid 1980's there were 
25. The Independent, (Bombay) 23 November 1990, p.7. 
26. Ibid., p. 27. 
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at least 15,000 Ethiopian Jews left behind in Ethiopia, 
when premature publicity put on abrupt end to "operation 
Moses" a secret mission that flew at least 12,000 jews to 
Israel with the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, 
the renewal of the relations was facilitated between those 
Jews who had already immigrated to Israel particularly in 
"operation Moses" and their relations who were forced to 
remain behind in Ethiopia, Ethiopian consent was obtained 
for the rapid air lift of all the Jews from the Addis Ababa 
to Israel on 24 May 1991. About 15,000 Ethiopian Jews 
27 
arrived in Israel through the "Operation Soloman". One 
more fundamental reason for Israel's involvement in 
Ethiopia has been the fear of the Islamic fundamentalist 
region in Sudan led by General Bashir. Sudan itself is 
engaged in an ethnic conflict with its own Christian 
population in the south of the country. The Ethiopian 
government, allowed to Israeli exports to cross the border 
to Sudan and establish link with the Christian Guerrillas 
who were fighting the central Sudanese government. Thus, 
Israeli military mission supported the southern rebel 
movement in Sudan and supplied military training and arms. 
By as early as 1963, Israeli involvement in southern Sudan 
27. New From Israel, Vol. XXXVIII, No.7, July 1991 
The Consulate of Israel, Bombay, pp. 10-15, 
was in evident through contact with Israeli embassies in 
28 Uganda, Ethiopia, Congo, and Chad. 
Israeli attention has been always attracted by 
Kurds. Its support to Kurds began in 1958. However, 
large scale aid in the form of arms, ammunition and Israeli 
military advisors began in 1963. The first training course 
for Kurdish officers run by Israeli instructors was held in 
29 the Kurdistan mountains in August 1965. In June 1967, 
one reports stated that, the Kurds aided the Israeli war 
efforts by mounting an offensive against the Iraqis which 
30 kept the later from offering aid to other Arab armies. 
In September 1967 the Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barazani 
visited Israel, and Israel aided the Kurds with money to 
the tune of $ 500,000 a month. •^•'" The Magen David Adorn 
28. Yanir, n..l9, p.96. See also, M.U. Bashir, The 
Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace,Barnes 
and Noble, New York, 1975, pp. 120-129. See 
Bubawa Misawa, Middle East System and African 
Perception of Israel, India Quarterly, 
Vol.XLVI, No.2 and 3, April-September 1990, 
pp. 171-183. 
29. Hallemi, No.17, p.18. 
30. Shimon Peres, David's Sling, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, London 1970, pp. 284-286. 
31. Hallami, n. 17, p. 18. 
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(Israel's Red Cross) supplied aid to Kurdish refugees 
through Turkey in July 1991. Defence Minister Moshe Arens 
has stated that "we can certainly feel the suffering and 
32 
oppression felt by the Kurds." 
The relation between the Israel and Maronite 
Christians of Lebanon including the design for a Maronite 
state are part of its periphery strategy. As early as the 
1920's the dream of an alliance first appeared in Zionist 
writtings with the Maronites. The hope for a christian 
Lebanon allied with Zionist was expressed by Uladimir 
Jabotinsky in the 1930s. In Israel, hundred of Phalangist 
fighters were trained alongside Israeli paratroopers in 
1976. Israel spent $ 150 million on military supplies 
during 1975 and 1977 for the Phalangist militia. However, 
33 it is alleged that the bill were paid by the U.S. 
The military relation between Israel and South 
Africa are very closed. Today the Uzi and Galil weapons 
are visible in South Africa. The history of military 
alliance has been long and rich. South Africa supplied 
whatever Israel needed in join projects and collaboration 
32. News From Israel, Vol. XXVIII, No.7, July 1991, p.2 
33. Avner, Yanir, Dilemmas of Security, Politics, 
Strategy and the Israeli Experience in 
Lebanon, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1987, pp. 22-28. 
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with Israel. Israel received military assistance from 
South Africa during the war with the Arabs in the Middle 
East."^ '^  A special chemical mix, South Africa imported is 
used at the urban plant near Netanya in the production of 
reinforced steel. In December 1974 Israeli Gabrial sea-to-
sea missiles were delivered to South Africa. Light, swift 
missile boats are now being produced in South Africa which 
were originally developed by Israel. Israeli air forces 
been working and training together with the air forces of 
South Africa for many years. This means mainly holding 
joint flying exercise, sending Israeli pilots as 
instructors and providing Israeli advice on planning air 
35 bases and maintaining air craft. 
South Africa has played a major role in Israel's 
nuclear programme. There have been universified claims 
that South Africa first shipped uranium to Israel as early 
as 1957. South Africa reportedly delivered uranium in 
36 
return for conventional weapons. In 1978, there were 
18,000 Israeli in South Africa, and in 1981 the number went 
34. Hallami, n.l7 , pp. 116-122. 
35. Ibid., p. 123. 
36. Ibid., pp. 133, 134, 196. 
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to 20,000. These immigration to South Africa has been 
encouraged by efforts to recruit Israelis to work there. 
Begin, the head of the Israel - South Africa 
Friendship league, has stated that: "the two states share 
the states of international outcasts, and each is acutely 
aware that its national survival is at stake. Moreover, 
South Africa's Large Jewish Community (115,000) has 
extremely close links with Israel.... it is not surprising 
then that political, economic and military collaboration 
37 between Israel and South Africa should have flourished." 
Israel's own special agenda on military aid and 
connections contains a unique Jewish factor. Over the 
years a survey of its arms sales practices discloses a 
fairly strong correspondence between those countries with 
Jewish presence mostly in the non-western world. A partial 
list includes countries like Argentia, Brazil, Chile, 
Ethiopia, Gautemala, Mexico, South Africa and Morocco. The 
purpose here is to maintain free and continuous contact 
with every one of those Jewish community and to facilitate 
their movement to Israel and to guarantee their religious 
and cultural rights. In the world market today the ability 
of Israel's armaments is the equivalent of the showing the 
37. Peter L. Bunee, The Growth of South Africa's 
Defence Industry and its Israeli Connection, 
The RUSI Journal, Vol. 129, No.2, June 1984, 
p. 45. 
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flage In this sense, Israel is capable of offering its 
friends not only military assistance but also moral 
support. 
Israel's Nuclear Capability and the Arab Response 
Israel has maintained nuclear deterrence as part of 
her security. Israel is the only state in the Middle East 
to be seriously suspected of having created a nuclear 
weapon option of some sort. Since 1959, Israel had a 
nuclear research programme in operation. In order to 
eliminate the numerical disadvantage vis-a-vis the Arab 
countries, Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion had persuaded 
President De-Gaulle to build an atomic reactor in 
Israel.-^ ^ 
In 1958 the Israel's reactor Dimona in Negev, 
originally built with the help of french is capable of 
producing weapon's grade material. Israel has always 
refused to place its nuclear installation under 
39 international inspection and to sign the NPT. Israel 
desires to maintain a certain degree uncertainty alive in 
38. Edgar, Oballance, The Third Arab-Israeli War, Taber 
and Faber, London, l972, p.47. ^ee also, 
Stephan, Green, Taking Sides, America's 
Secret Relations with a Mil-itant Israel, 
William Morrow and Company, New York, 1984, 
pp. 149-179. 
39. Galal Elrashidi, The Arabs and the World of the 
Seventies, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 
1977, p. 72. 
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the mind of the Arab governments and to encourage its repu-
tation for secrecy which leaves its enemies continuously 
40 
uncertain about what Israel really has. 
Israeli President Katzir in December 1974 stated 
that, "It has been our intention to provide the potential 
for nuclear development. We now have that potential. We 
will defend this country with all possible means at land. 
We have to develop more powerful and new arms to protect 
n ..41 
ourselves. 
Israeli leaders believe that Israel can not afford 
to lose a war. Israel's basic aversion to fore closing the 
nuclear option draws its strength from its constant concern 
for security. In this context, even hints of a nuclear 
capability have immense utility. For the first time 
Nuclear weapons would provide to Israel with the ability to 
> 
threaten unacceptable punishment in retaliation to an Arab 
challenge to Israel survival. Second, the sheer size of 
punishment involved would make it nearly certain that the 
Arabs would correctly assess the damage they might suffer 
42 
should they attempt to challenge Israel's survival. The 
40. L. Leaton and J. Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear-
Weapons , Chatto and Wingus, London, 1962, 
pp. 176-177. 
41. Roger F. Rajak, Nuclear Status and Policies of the 
Middle East Countries, International Affairs, 
Vol. 59, No.4, Autumn 1983, p. 593. 
42. Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy 
for the 198Qs, Columbia University Press, 
New York, 1982, p. 54 
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Israel needs in nuclear field are different from the U.S., 
France or China. Israel nuclear weapon are designed to be 
used only in the Middle East and they have to fit into 
Local condition Israel does not need high-yield hydrogen 
bombs which would injure its own peoples if used against 
its immediate neighbours. In the 1960s Israel realized 
that what Israel needed tactical nuclear weaponry. This 
consideration led to the development of nuclear Shell fired 
from the 155 mm Howitzer or from the naval gun. These 
Shells contain a low yield, two kiloton nuclear device the 
ideal nuclear weapons for Israel. It is reported that 
Israel now possesses 76 nuclear weapons stockpiled and has 
deployed 100 short-range (400 mile) Jericho - 11 missiles 
44 
capable of carrying a nuclear war head. 
In July 1981, when Israeli airforce destroyed the 
Iraq reactor, Arial Sharon stated that "declared principle 
in Israel's defense policy for the 1980's was its 
determinition to prevent confrontationist states from 
access to the nuclear weapons" thus demanding a unique 
nuclear position for the Israel in the re-gion. 
43. Hallami, n. 11,. p. 134. 
44. Shyam, Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East, 
Routledge, New York, 1988, pp. 34-35. 
45. M.V. Leeuwen and B. Soetendrop, Israel, H. Muller, 
ed., A European non-Proliferation Policy, 
Prospects and Problems^ Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1987, pp. 236-237. 
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Regarding the policies and practice of obtaining 
nuclear weapons, very little is known in case of the Arab 
countries. Only Iraq and Libya have defined the 
achievement of a military nuclear potential as a national 
objective. The other Arab states notably, Egypt and Syria 
have not ranked this objective high on their national 
strategic agenda. Their reasons have ranged from political 
considerations to limilation of economic and technological 
AC 
resources. Libya has given priority to acquiring a 
military nuclear capability but due to the absence of 
sufficient scientific-technological expertise Libya's 
colonel Mummer Qaddafi did once try to purchase nuclear 
47 
weapons from China and Pakistan but without success. 
Libian President Qaddafi even threatened to destroy Israel 
Dimona complex and to accuse Egypt and Jordan for failing 
to offer him the use of air bases from which he could to 
48 launch an attack. Iraq is another country which is 
considered to harbor serious nuclear ambitious. Israel has 
46. A. Leveran, The Military Balance in the Middle 
East in A. Levran, (ed.). The Middle East 
Military Balance 1986, Jerusalem Post, 
Jerusalem, 1^87, p.- 89. 
47. Ibid., p. 91. 
48. L.S. Spector, Going Nuclear: The Spread of Nuclear 
Weapons,1961-1987, Bullinger Publishing 
Company, Cambridge, London, 1987, p.129. 
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done all it can to contain Iraqi ambitions of joining the 
nuclear club. Since Israeli preemptive strike against 
Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, no Arab states are consi-
dered to be capable of producing a nuclear weapon within 
the next two decades. The situation may change but there 
are no Arab state at present which can pose nuclear threat 
to the security of Israel. Except Algeria, all the Arab 
States have signed NPT. In the nuclear sphere only one 
Muslim state, Pakistan has registered any genuine progress 
and no other Muslim state has achieved a military 
potential in nuclear terms. The transfer of Pakistani 
nuclear weapons to the Arabs would constitute a real threat 
or serious potential danger to Israeli security. Israel 
also fears that in future they may actually threaten the 
Israeli monopoly. Israeli Premier Begin, stated that "Israel 
would not tolerate any enemy whether Arab or non-Arab 
49 
acquiring nuclear weapons capability." This Begin 
doctrine was meant to include both Libya and Pakistan. 
Israel has been thinking about to destroy Pakistani nuclear 
facility and it has been urging India to facilitate such an 
action. However, India refused to co-operate with 
Israel. 
49. C. Raja Mohan, Nuclear Free Zones: Illusion and 
reality, in K. Subrahmanyams, (ed.), India 
and the Nuclear Challenge, Lancer Inter-
national in Association with Institute for 
Defense Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, 
1986, p. 157. 
50. Saudi Gazette .(Riyadh), 2 April 1988, p.6. 
For bombing the Pakistani uranium enrichmnent plant 
at Kabuta Israel sought refueling facilities for its 
bombers of the Indian air base at Jamnagar near the 
Pakistani border. Israel also offered to provide the 
Indian Air force with high explosive bombs to do the 
job. As recently at 1987 senior Pakistani officials 
declared that Pakistan recognized that by transfering 
nuclear weapons to states hostile to Israel it would be 
encouraging Israel to consider retaliatory action against 
52 it by cooperating with India. Israel while maintaining 
clandestine nuclear capability, seeks the policy of preven-
tion through use of force for not allowing any Arab state 
at particular and Muslim states at large to go nuclear. 
51. Maharashtra Herald (Pune), 28 March 1988 
52. Leveran n. 46, p. 97. Pakistani President Zulfikar 
Ali Bhutto had warned the Arab world of the 
threat posed to it by an Israeli nuclear 
capability "We know that Israel and South 
Africa have full nuclear capability. The 
Christian, Jewish and Hindu Civilizations 
have this capability. The Communist Powers 
also possess it. Only Islamic civilization 
was without it but that position was about to 
change" Libya, Iraq and the UAE, are reported 
to have offered aid for the Pakistani nuclear 
programme. 
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Chemical Weapons 
Israel is the only country in the Middle East which 
maintains nuclear weapon arsenal. On the other hand Arabs 
remain unable to match Israel's nuclear capability by 
nuclear weapons. The Arab States argue that their chemical 
weapons and ballistic missiles counter and deter the use of 
Israel's nuclear weapons. In the Middle East six countries 
are said to possess the chemical-weapon arsenal. Iraq , 
Iran, Egypt, Syria, Libya and Israel. 
The development of chemical agents started Iraq in 
1970's but did not really make progress until 1983. The 
western nation became alarmed and Iraq suspious as by that 
time began to buy large quantity of chemicals. It was too 
late by then since.the Iraqi achieved all the facilities and 
chemicals needed to produce weapons. The production of 
these chemical agents takes place in a plant about 40 miles 
outside the city of Sammara in the desert of Iraq. About 
1000 tons of poison gas can be produced by Iraq every 
53 year. Another country pursuing chemical warfare 
programme is Syria. It is believed that Syria has become 
fifth nation in the world which has developed a chemical 
53. RUSI News brief, Vol. 8, No.6, June 1988. Royal 
United Services Institute London, p. 47. 
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weapon capability and has developed Nerve gas weapons with 
the ability of hitting Israeli targets. The existence of 
the chemical production facility has been known for quite 
sometime, but it has not been a threat to Israeli until 
Syria has created warheads to carry the gas. 
A chemical-use warhead specially have been 
specially designed by Syria to fit into their Russian made 
SS-21 and Saud missiles. The Israeli dilemma is now the 
Syrian plan to use this weapon. As we have seen during the 
Gulf war, it could be used in a preemptive strike at 
Israeli airfields or against civilian targets. The Syrians 
have emphasized that Syria does not possess chemical 
weapons capability and even achieving such Neapons is not 
part of Syria "desire for" strategic parity with Israel. 
Syria and Iraq both are believed to have acquired facili-
ties to develop biological agents and missiles to be used 
as delivery vehicles for these type of weapons. Israel has 
had a chemical weapons capability since 1970's and is 
believed to be increasing its stockpile of gas weapons. 
Israel has also been developing gas masks since 1967 to 
boost its civil defence programme. Feeling threatened by 
54. Ron. Mathews, Dangerous New Twists in the Middle 
East's Arms Race Spiral, RUSI Journal, 
Vol. 135, No.4, Winter 1990, p.3^ ": 
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chemical weapons capabilities of Arab states, Israel began 
to take sufficient chemical defenses particularly since 
1985 and has provided gas masks and other chemical defen-
sive equipments to almost all of its population. It 
started the production of air and purification systems on 
armoured vehicles, respiratbr masks, protective clothing 
and personel treatment kits is case of Injury. Israel is 
one of the best prepared countries against chemical or 
biological attacks. Installing gas masks is the another 
important defensive measures of Israel to protect their 
civilian population in their city bomb shelters, and there-
by reducing the possibility of high casuallties among Its 
small population. 
Libya can produce large amounts of chemical 
weapons. U.S. defence intelligence reported that Libya is 
already producing small amounts of mustered gas (30-50 
tons) as well as the nerve gas sarin. Rhabta chemical 
weapon complex of Libya is reputed to be the biggest over 
constructed with a deadly recipe of chemicals. 
The spread of chemical weapons in the Middle East 
is creating higher tensions in this already dangerous part 
55. Armed Forces, Vol. 7, No.4, April 1988, p. 136 
See also Armed Forces Journal International 
May 1990, p.60. 
56. Mathews, n.54, p.36. 
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of the world. A senior Israeli Defense force officer said 
"it has changed the rules of war in the Middle East". The 
Iran-Iraq war has changed the outlook on chemical weapons 
by making them a possible alternative in any conflict in 
the region and it seems that all major state in the Middle 
East are actively developing a powerful chemical weapon 
capability. As weapons of mass destruction they can be 
used either as a deterrent against aggressors, or as a 
devise to prevent a rout on the battlefield. And in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arabs could inflict serious 
casualities on Israeli population. This superiority in 
chemical weapons could give them first-strike capability 
and a effective deterrence against Israel's nuclear 
capability. 
Missiles 
The proliferation of missiles among Arab states is 
causing alarm in Israel. In previous Arab-Israeli conflict 
only confronting states bordering Israel, had the 
capability of attacking Israel with SSMs. This is no 
longer case, Iraq and potentially Libya now have this 
capability. Now currently, ten countries in the Middle 
East have ballistic missiles; notably Algeria, Egypt, Iran, 
57. RUSI Newsbrief, Vol. 8, No.6, June 1988, p.47 
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Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria and 
Yemen. 
The missile proliferation commenced in the Middle 
East during the early part of the 1980s. It has been 
estimated that Iraq and Iran during their war have rained 
down on each other around 875 surface-to-surface missile 
(SSM's), and upto 200 of these being fired by the Iraqis 
before 1985. Falling on Iranian cities they caused 1500 
CO 
deaths and 7000 Injuries. As a result of the Iran-Iraq 
war missiles have become supreme terror weapons inflicting 
damage besides the excessively high human and material cost 
of close-contact combat. Therefore,- all the major 
countries in the region are now busy in stock-piling SSMs. 
This is obviously raising tension amongs the Arab States 
and Israel On the one hand, and in the region on the 
other. The worry for Israel is that missiles and their 
chemical weapons are upsetting the military balance in the 
59 
region which has long favoured the Israelis. The air 
superiority of Israel has always ensured that foes were 
deterred from pursuing war. Missiles erode the potency of 
58. Thomas L. Mc Naugher, Ballistic Missiles and 
Chemical Weapons. The Legacy of the Iran-
Iraq war. International Security, Vol. 15, 
No.2, Fall 1990, pp. 5-34. 
59. Frank Barnaby, Arms Control after the Gulf War, 
Conflict Studies, 240, April 1990, Research 
Institute For the study of conflict and 
Terrorism, Lond on, pp. 2-4. 
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this deterrence factor, making not only Israel notorious 
for pre-emptive strike, but also major Arab States nervous 
and consequently dangerous. Iraq lest-launched a three 
stage rocket, the AL Abid on December 5, 1989. This could 
potentially deliver nuclear war heads upto 2800 km., 
putting Russia, Greece, as well as Israel with in range . 
Iraq is also establishing a battery of 6 launchers for AL-
Hussain missiles near its wester border with Syria within 
range of Israel. 
In response to this changed strategic scenario, 
Israel has been building up its own missile potential. 
There have been two other development which have added 
further twists to the missile race spiral. In September 
1988 the launching of Israeli Ofek-I and in April 1990 the 
Ofel-2 experimental communication satilites. This means 
that the Middle East arms race has now spread into space. 
Currently no Middle East country has the capability to 
intercept missiles but, while Israel leads the race, Iraq 
claims that it has successfully tested an anti-missile 
system, Alfaw. Israel is also testing the medium-range 
ballistic missile the 1400 km. Jericho-II. These develop-
ments appear to signal Israel's intent to maintain the 
60. Newsbrief, Vol. 10, No.5, May 1990, p.40, 
61. Mathews, n. 54, p. 35. 
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credibility of its pre-emptive strike strategy; the 
ability to place into space intelligence-gathering instru-
ments the possession of an anti-ballistic missile system to 
neutralize retaliatory strikes and the capacity via the 
Jericho-II to strike into enemy territory. 
Israel's military capability in the region is far 
superior that the rest of Arab countries. Since it came 
into being, it has constantly pursuing the defence policy 
which is not averse to pre-emptive striking and aimsat 
maintaining military superiority in the region. 
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CHAPTER III 
ISRAEL AND NEIGHBOURS 
This chapter deals with the role of Israeli neigh-
bouring states namely, Jordan, Syria and Iraq, in the Arab 
Israeli conflict and peace process. It also focusses on 
the Israeli perception of threat from these countries. The 
modern state of Jordan dates back only to March 1921 when 
Britain, the league of nation's mandate power agreed to 
back a national government under Abdullah the son of Sharif 
Hussein Ibn Ali of the Hijaz over territories east of the 
Jordan river provided that government accepted British 
supervision. The U.K. formally recognized Transjordan as 
an independent constitutional state on 25 May 1923 under 
the rule of Amir Abdullah. TransJordan's full independence 
was not to be achieved until the treaty of London was 
signed in March 1946. Amir Abdullah was proclaimed king in 
May 1946. 
Transjordan was renamed as the Hashemite kingdom of 
Jordan in August 1950, and the Hashemite king of Jordan was 
proclaimed over the East and West Bank of the Jordan, a 
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month later the Jordanian Dinar became the official 
currency for the entire country. 
On 14 May 1948 when the British Mandate of 
Palestine ended, the Jews in Palestine proclaimed the 
establishment of State of Israel and widespread fighting 
broke out between Jews and Arabs. Eventually a ceasefire 
was established and armistice on 3 April 1949 demarcated 
I 
defacto borders for the new State of Israel. 
Jordan alone controlled a vital part of historic 
Palestine during 1948 and 1967. The West Bank and East 
Jerusalem both captured by Israel in 1967 were the part of 
Jordan. Jordan received the hardest blows with the loss of 
the West Bank. Half of its entire agricultural production 
was destroyed along with approximately 1/3 of its earnings 
from agricultural exports (the West Bank which had until 
2 then accounted for upto 45% of Jordan's GDP). The West 
Bank potential for earning foreign exchange from tourism 
passed into Israeli hands. Before 1967, the number of 
tourists visiting annually the tourist centres Jerusalem 
3 
and West Bank were about more than half million. In 
addition Israel pushed thousands of Palestinian refugees 
1. Valerie Yorke, Domestic, Politics and Regional 
Security: Jordan, Syria and Israel: The end 
of an era, IISS, Gower, Sydney and other, 
1988, p.3. 
2 . Ibid. , p. 55. 
3. Peter Gusber, Jordan: Crossroad of Middle Eastern 
Events, Westview Press, London, 1983, p.45. 
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into Jordan. After the June 1967 war about 300,000 
Palestinians crossed the river Jordan. Thus, the West Bank 
was an important part of the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan. 
Jordan's perception of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and the Palestinian issue flows from its geography and 
demography. Jordan stands along the longest confrontation 
lines with Israel, therefore, Jordan plays a central role 
as an Arab-confrontationist state with Israel. Jordan has 
more than 300 miles front with Israel, and 16 miles coast-
line on the Gulf of Aqaba and its Dead sea coast is roughly 
80 miles from North to South where Israel holds nearly 50 
miles of the western shores. The Jordan valley is 
Israel's preferred border^ the vulnerable parts of the 250 
mile border between Jordan and Israel today are less than 
20 miles of relatively weak defenses specially the region 
of Bet Shean Valley on the eastern side and the relative 
low land's of the Upper Jordan valley and Irbid region on 
the western side. Jordan, this is the closest of all Arab 
countries to the conflict and more deeply affected by it. 
By the early 1960's a slight majority of Jordan's 
population were residents of the East Bank. Nearly one 
million Palestinians had been added as full citizens to the 
Terence Pritte, Israel Miracle in the Desert, 
Prager Publishers, New York, 1967, p.76. 
J.E. Mroz, Beyond Security Private Perceptions 
among Arabs and Israelis, Pergamon Press, New 
York, 1980, p.155. 
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original 400,000 Jordanians, the population of Amman in 
three years from 30,000 to about 200,000.^ Jordan has been 
facing problem of the increased pressure put on the 
available resources a? the result of the rapid population 
growth. This was initiated with expulsion of people from 
Palestine by Israel in 1948 and from the West Bank in 1967. 
Today half of Jordan's population is Palestinian most of 
them refugees after the 1948 and 1967 wars Jordan is the 
only Arab country to have granted automatic citizenship to 
the refugees. The population of the Islamic occupied West 
Bank has Jordanian citizenship as well. 
Jordan's Palestinians comprise the largest concen-
tration of Palestinians living outside the area of 
Palestine. The presence of Palestinians influence and 
constrains Jordanian policy more than any other domestic 
factor. The security dillema Jordan is facing the presence 
of large number of Palestinians refugees by 1988 numbering 
862,000 out of a total 2.25 million U.N. registered 
refugees and about another 210,000 who were displaced 
across the Jordan river as a result of the 1967 war. 
6. Hussein Ibn. Talal, Uneasy Lies the head, Heinemann, 
London, 1962, p. 103. 
7. Alvi Plaseov, The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan 
1948-1957, Frank Cassco, 1981, pp. 29-40. 
8. David Mcdowall, Palestine and Israel: The Uprising 
and Beyond" I.B. Tauris and Co. Publishers, 
London, 1989, pp. 79-89. 
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At present, Jordanian watch with trepedition as over 17,000 
Soviet Jews a month pour into Israel. Jordanian fears that 
expansionist forces in Israel will push the West Bankers 
into Jordan swamping the already fragile economy and 
9 
upsetting the delicate demographic balance. There is a 
fear that Jordanian - Palestinian historical ties and the 
weight of Palestinian numbers could one day lead to dis-
integration and violence in Jordan. Jordan is constantly 
under strains rather at pains due to the fact that about 
half the population of Jordan is Palestinian and absorbing 
a further 750,000 or so highly politicized West Bank 
inhabitants would not only make the Jordanians a minority 
in their own country but could undermine the existence of 
the present Jordanian regime. Therefore, Jordan continues 
to regard the Palestinians as a security risk. Domesti-
cally, it believes that keeping of demographic balance is 
very essential for security and stability of Jordan. At the 
same time, regionally keeping Arab political support for 
Jordan is an important factor in maintaining political 
stability. In other words, the government must seek a 
balanced policy which is sufficiently pro-Palestinian to 
11 
win at least the acquiescence of Jordan's Palestinians. 
9. Stanley, Reed, Jordan and the Gulf Crisis, Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 69, No.5, Winter 1990/91, p.65. 
10. Avi. Plaseov, A Palestinian State? Examing the 
Alternatives in Charles Tripp, (ed.) Regional 
Security in the Middle East, IISS, Cower, 
London, 1984, p.65. 
11. Yorke, n.l, pp. 243, 266. 
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Jordan was the only gateway for West Bank Palestinians to 
the rest of the Arab world and in order to travel abroad 
they must carry Jordanian passport. Jordanian consent to 
the maintenance of open bridges over the Jordan river 
enables some million Arabs on the average to pass between 
12 West Bank and Arab World yearly. In the June 1967 war 
West Bank was conquered by Israel, and the West Bank with 
the connection with Jordan is seen as the main factor 
diterring Israel from annexing this area. Jordan's 
soveriegnty there is upheld by International Law. Jordan 
was also a market for West Bank agricultural produce. 
The West Bank public institutions such as 
hospitals, schools, mosques and homes for the aged were 
subsidized by Amman, Jordanian government contributed an 
estimated 257o to the budgets of the West Bank municipali-
13 ties. Jordan offered the Palestinians a good opportunity 
to keep-up their fight but Palestinians misused this 
permission. The activities of the commondo v;ho were armed 
and subsidized by Syria led to large-scale Israeli 
reprisals against the West Bank in 1966. As a result of 
this the PLO's office was close down in Jerusalem and kino 
o 
restricted the PLO activities. 
12. Clinton Bailey, Changing attitudes towards Jordan 
in the West Bank, Middle East Journal,Vol.32, 
Spring 1978, p. 15^! 
13. Ibid., p. 157. 
14. Yorks, n.l., p.13. 
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Alfatah and smaller splinter organisations that together 
made up the new PLO erected a state-within-a-state between 
15 1968-1970 challenging the Hashemite authority in Jordan. 
King Hussein (who was declared king of the Hashmite Kingdom 
of Jordan in August 1952) was torn between the Arab popu-
lar demand for scope for the Fadayeen to operate against 
Israel from the East Bank and his desire to avert the 
heavy Israeli reprisals on his kingdom which every gurrilla 
raid brought in its wake. Israel bombed from the air on 
the town of Salt 25 kilometers north of Amman in March 1969 
and caused much suffering to Palestinians as well as 
Jordanian and raised question about the usefulness of 
1 6 
Fadayeen provocation of Israeli revangefulness. Since 
1970 Jordan refused to allow P.L.O. military acts to be 
carried out by way of its territory. 
The issue of West Bank is a crucial element in the 
Jordan's relations with Israel and the P.L.O. Jordan no 
longer represents the Palestinians since 1970 and a 
decision was made at the Rabat Arab Summit meeting to 
recognize the P.L.O. as the sole representative of the 
15. William B. Quandt, Fuad, Jabbar and Ann M. Lesch, 
The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, 
University oT Calfornia, Los Angeles, 1973, 
pp. 195-215. 
16. P. Dasgupta, Cheated by the World: The Palestine 
Experience, Orient Longman, Bombay, 1988, 
pp. 185-186. 
17. Asher, Susser, Double Jeopardy: PLO Strategy 
Toward Israel and Jordan, The Washington 
Institute for near East Policy, Washington, 
1987, pp. 20-35. 
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Palestinian people. Although large number of Palestians 
line in Jordan, Jordan is no longer recognized by the Arab 
as the representative of Palestinians nor it claims to be. 
The Jordanian Concept of Peaceful Settlement: 
Israel has always looked for a partial peace with 
Jordan. Both Israel and the U.S. have been trying to draw 
Jordan into separate negotiations but Jordan wants to put 
together a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation which 
1 8 
could act as a team in eventual negotiations. On LI 
February 1985, the signing of Jordanian PLO joint accord 
has committed Jordan to an international conference and to 
a PLO- Participation in a joint delegation with Jordan and 
PLO to the principle of exchange of land for peace. In 
addition, the agreement also commits the PLO to a point 
that the Palestinian right to exercise determination would 
be within the context of a confederation comprising 
Palestine and Jordan. However, the Palestinian National 
Council rejected the Jordanian - PLO Joint Accord in 
1986.•'•^  A poll in 1982 suggested that 72% of the 
Palestinian of the West Bank felt that King Hussein in no 
way represented them. Only 17 per cent felt he was 
acceptable as their co-representative. A year later 
another poll suggested that 66% of the population of the 
18. Yorke, n.l., p.75. 
19. Ibid., p. 277. 
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occupied territories considered him to be insincere and 
hostile to Palestinian interests. By 1986 support for 
20 Hussein had fallen to 3.37o. 
The initifada has shown beyond all doubt that King 
Hussein cannot represent the Palestinian people. After 
eight months of unrest in the territories on 31 July 1988, 
King Hussein formally relinquished his claim to the 
occupied territory of West Bank and initiated the 
administrative steps to sever all those links which implied 
soveriegnty or responsibility for the fate of the territory, 
He canceled the Jordanian programme of 1986 for the social 
and economic development of the Israeli occupied 
21 territories. The Kingdom wanted the whole world to 
realize that Jordan was not intent on rivaling the PLO in 
its drine to represent the Palestinians and serve their 
interests and wanted to remove all skeptieism vis-a-vis its 
relation with the West Bank. King Hussein's decision was a 
major blow for Israel's Labour Party. Since 1967 the 
Labour Party had maintained that the foundation of any 
settlement of the territories should be in collaboration 
with Jordan. Thus, King Hussein could no longer be the 
sole partner to a settlement in the West Bank. King 
Hussein leaving the Palestinian to speack for themselves 
20. Mcdowall, n.8, p.75. 
21. See, The Middle East Toward Ending the Dead Lock, 
Novosti Press Agency Publishing House Moscow, 
1989, p.18. 
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took the so-called Jordanian option off the table. King's 
move has put pressure upon the PLO leadership and sent a 
clear message to Israel and its ally, the U.S. that they 
could no longer hang on to their refusal to deal with the 
P.L.O. P.L.O and the Palestinian people moved rapidly 
towards negotiating and reappraisal of strategy that 
resulted in the major shift at the 19th Palestinian 
National Council meeting in November 1988. They accepted 
the U.N. resolution 242 and the concept of co-existence of 
two states in historical Palestine. The P.L.O. peace 
initiative Arafat's declaration in Geneva in November. 
An proclamation of an independent Palestinian state in 
Israeli-occupied territories, and the subsequent U.S. 
decision to open a dialogue with the P.L.O. were the 
subsequent notable events. 
Jordan was never in a position to negotiate the 
future of the West Bank. King Hussein realized that he 
could not afford to appear to be collaboration with Israel 
while competing with the P.L.O. over control of the West 
22 Bank.^^ 
Jordan has always opposed a partial settlement to 
the Middle East crises and has instead called for an 
international peace conference to solve the problem. Jordan 
has recognized the P.L.O. as the sole, legitimate 
22. Asher, Susser, The Jordanian Concept of Peaceful 
Settlement in Haim Shaked and D. Dishon,(ed.) 
Middle East Contemporary Survey, Vol. VIII, 
The Day"in Centre tor Middle Eastern and 
African Studies, Tel Aviv, 1986, pp.517-519. 
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representative of the Palestinian people and no Arab State 
may act unilaterally in solving the Palestinian issue. 
Besides, Jordan does not accept any Arab State to be an 
23 
alternative to the P.L.O. Jordan made it clear that it 
is prepared to persue the course of peace with Israel on 
the following terms: 
Israel's withdrawal from all Arab territories 
occupied since 1967 as well as the right of the Palestinian 
24 people to self-determination. 
Jordan's leadership believes that the most appro-
priate vehicle for achieving a settlement is through an 
international conference under the auspices of the U.N. , 
Jordan still has a vital role to play in the peace process 
as a confrontationist state with the longest border with 
Israel, a role that has not ended with the disengagement 
from the West Bank. King Hussein has stated that "Jodan 
will not give up its commitment to take part in the peace 
25 process. Without the active participation the Jordan in 
the Middle East peace process, the chances of establishing 
23. Hassan, Ibn-Talal, Search for Peace: The Politics 
of the Middle~Ground in the Middle East, SF7 
Martin's Press, New York, 1984, pp. 45, 51,52 
24. See The Text of a Speech which king Hussein of 
Jordan delivered to the Los Angeles World 
Affairs Council, 6 November 1981,pp.248-256. 
25. Time, 15 August 1988 
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peace In the region are not promising. After the proclama-
tion of an independent Palestinian state, the P.L.O. was 
allowed to establish an embassy in Amman in January 1989, 
and the head-quarters of the Palestinian National Fund was 
reopened there in July 1989. 
SYRIA 
In 1920, the French toppled King Feisal bin Hussein 
and imposed their mandate over those areas which today 
comprise Syria and Lebanon. Subsequently during the period 
of the French mandate (1920-46) the sense of nationalism 
amongst Syrian grew as the Arab nationalist struggle for 
independence gained momentum. But the French pursued 
policies that prevented the growth of a unified Syrian 
political community. They weakened territorial unity by 
dividing the country into regions adopting ethnic and 
religious attitudes in their policy of recruitment into the 
army and a system of class divisions through bestowing 
preferential treatment on the Sunni urban elite in local 
27 government. 85% of Syria's population is Muslim, While 
the majority of the population are Arabic speaking, there 
are important non-Arab minorities with strong cultural 
identities, including Kurds, Arminians, Turcomans and 
28 Circassians. The Baath (Resurrection) movement was 
26. Robert, Satloff, Jordan Looks inward. Current 
History, Vol. 89, No.544, February 1990,p.59. 
27. Yorke, n.l, p. 98. 
28. Ibid., p. 99. 
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founded in the late 1940's and in 1953 this subsequently 
merged with the Arab Socialists Party. Baath was founded 
by Michael Aflaq a Greek orthodox christian and Salab Bilar 
a Sunni Muslim. The Baathist became an important factor in 
Syrian politics after 1954, participating coalition, 
penetrating the government apparatus and widening their 
appeal to bring industrial workers into the ranks along 
29 
with intellectuals and professionals. 
In a violent coup in February 1966, the radical 
military Baathists known as the neo-Baath eliminated the 
> 
more conservative old guard civilian Baathists and their 
military supporters. The Loss of Golan area to Israel in 
1967 war an intra-Alawite struggle for power entered 
between the Security-General of the Syrian General Command 
together with his civilian supporters and Hafedh Al-Asad 
30 
minister of Defence and his military supporters. Asad 
seized full power following a bloodless on 14 November 1970 
and became President of Syria in February 1971. 
For Syria the conflict with Israel has long 
involved three issues: Lebanon, the Golan heights and the 
Palestinians all of which are inter-linked. Syria lies 
just northeast of Israel. The Israeli-Syrian border is 
only about 70 km. long and runs across a high (300-500m) 
massif which peaks in the far north at Mount Hermon (Jabal 
Alsheikh). The Golan Heights is an strategic area, 
29. Joseph I. Malone The Arab Lands of Western Asia, 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1973, p.103. 
30. Yorke, n.l. p.103. 
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important both for the security of Syria and Israel. 
Israel occupied about 400 square mile area in the Golan 
during the six day war of 1967. The loss of the Golan has 
influenced much of Syrian foreign and defence policy and 
its domestic situation. By capturing the Golan Heights 
Israeli enjoyed a massive topographical advantage. The 
Syrian capital Damascus became completely exposed to the 
Israeli guns due to Israeli military position entrenched on 
the Golan Heights. The Israeli forces are in a position to 
present a threat to Damascus that is with in 40 miles of 
relatively easy terrains. The geography of the Golan 
requires that the Syrian should not face Israeli troops on 
the Heights because the Israelis would constitute a direct 
31 
on the plain leading to Damascus. 
The majority of the native Syrian population (over 
937o) was expelled by the Israeli forces from the Golan 
Heights. It is estimated that the number of Syrian 
refugees from the Golan is approximately 100,000 persons, 
most of them peasants whose homes and villages have been 
32 
razed to make room for the new Jewish Settlements. Only 
some 6000 native Druze residents remained in the Golan 
33 Heights after the Israeli occupation of 1967 war. 
31. David Astor and Valerie, Yorke, Peace in the Middle 
East: Super Powers and Security Guarantees: A 
Unique Reporti Corgi, a Division ol Trans 
world Publishers, London, 1978, p.29. 
32. Francis, Tusa, Lebanon 1982: Israeli Hubris or 
Syrian Strength, Armed Forces, Vol.6, No.9, 
September 1987, p.^HTi 
33. Uri Davis, antonia E. Marks and J. Richardson, 
Israel's Water Policies, Journal of Palestine 
Studies, No.9, 1979-80, pp. 26-27. 
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Syria is the region's most persistent confron-
tationist state having fought her neighbours in 1948, 1967, 
1973 and in 1982. The key to their rivalry is the Golan 
Heights. After Israel's decision on December 14, 1981 to 
extend its legal and administrative jurisdiction to the 
Golan Heights and to allow for the largest concentration of 
Israeli settlement in the Syrian Palateu, Syria fears 
that the Israel represents a serious challenge to their 
value and institutions. The Jewish settlements on the 
34 Golan heights house about 12,000 Israeli. Former Prime 
Minister Begin said, "We shall never withdraw from the 
Golan Heights. There is no such thing as giving up 
security in return for peace. There is no peace without 
security and without the Golan Heights there is no 
35 
security." 
Hafedh Asad is eager to regain the strategic Golan 
Heights captured by Israel in 1967. On March 8, 1986 
President Asad expressed this clearly when he stated that, 
"when we proclaimed this slogan of strategic parity a few 
years ago we were aware that this did not just mean a tank 
vs. a tank or a gun vs. - a gun but parity in all the 
domains of life : the economic human, social, political, 
cultural and military .... we knew then that this could not 
be achieved overnight but necessitated time and appropriate 
34. Jordan Times, 12 June 1991, p.l 
35. Morz, n,5, p.76. 
78 
efforts; however, we have already convered a measurable 
distance". Syria has found itself in the position of 
being the major confrontationist state with Israel. 
Syria's policy which advocated for the need for 
Arab solidarity against Israel received severe blow when a 
separate peace treaty was signed between Israel and Egypt 
in 1978. The signing of the camp David agreement where put 
a restrain on Syria's military options also made it more 
vulnerable than ever before. Subsequently President Asad 
tried hard to get Soviet support militarily for dealing 
with Israel. Syria in absence of Arab solidarity to deal 
with Israel militarily is under severe compulsion to 
negotiate with Israel instead of taking back Golan Height 
militarily. 
The Palestine community has always been regarded as 
important potential threat to Syrian stability especially 
with the growth of the Palestinian nationalist movement 
after 1968. It also fears that actions of Syrian based 
Palestinian commandos might increase the danger of Israeli 
retaliation against Syrian targets. Under this fear Syria 
has restricted the guerrilla activities of Palestinian 
peoples. 
Syria was the ' only Arab State which provided the 
Palestinians with an operational base. It was through Syria 
36. A. Levran,The Military Balance in the Middle East, 
in Levran, (ed.), The Middle East Military 
Balance 1986, Jerusalem Post, Jerusalem,198/, 
pp. 185-186. 
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that Soviet arms for the commando in Lebanon were 
channeled. In 1976 Syria's military intervention in 
Lebanon was done on the side of the Pro-government Largely 
Maronite force, and against the Palestinian Leflist 
alliance. The P.L.O. publicly complained at Syria's 
passivity in the face of Israeli attacks on Palestine 
targets in Lebanon, and at the confiscation of Soviet 
37 
weapons destined for the P.L.O. 
The Palestinian issue has been very important for 
Syria both ideologically and strategically. Syria regards 
itself as the leader of Arab nationalism and the supporter 
of Palestinian course. It held the Palestinian issue 
hostage for the sake of Golan Heights, fearing to be left 
isolated either to fight or to negotiate with Israel. 
Therefore, it has been more alarmed by the Israeli 
Palestinian negotiations as any progress towards the 
resolution of the Palestinian issue would underscore its 
failure to regain the Golan Heights from Israel. Untill 
Syrian intervention in Lebanon in 1976, it was regarded as 
a reliable supporter of Palestinians against Israel. Since 
1976 Syrian intervention, there seems to be a facit 
understanding between Israel and Syria over their respec-
tive security concerns in Lebanon. Probably this facit 
understanding forced Asad to bring under restrictions the 
37. Yorke, n.l, p.132. 
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Palestinian guerrilla operations in Lebanon. 
Israel and Syria fought a short war in June 1982, 
the fourth between these two countries in the last 35 years. 
This was a small part of the larger Lebanon war, known to 
the Israelis as "Operation Peace for Galilee"Israel's air 
operations during the summer of 1982 were extra-ordinarily 
successful. The Syrians suffered a devastating defeat with 
very less Israeli loss in the war. Syria completely lost 
air defense system including 20 surface-to-air missile 
batteries (SA-2,3,6) and in excess of 85 fighter aircraft 
(MIG 21, MIG 23, MIG 25) and because of this defeat Syrian 
Ground forces in Lebanon had virtually no defence against 
38 
Israeli air attacks. Syria lost more than 400 tanks. 
Israel and Lebanon signed an agreement on 17 May 1983. 
Syria did not accept the Lebanon-Israel agreement as it 
affected its own security. Syria did not accept the 
political arrangements which as a result of Israeli 
influence might have led to partition and the creation of a 
pro-Israeli Maronite canton in Lebanon. If Israel were to 
encourage such divisions along sectarian lines, Syria 
38. W. Sith, Carus, Military Lessons of the 1982: 
Israel-Syria Conflict, in Robert E. Harkary 
and Stephanie G. Newman, (ed.). Lesson of 
Recent Wars in the Third World: Approaches 
and Case Studies, Vol. 1"^  Lexington Book, 
Lexington Toronto, 1985, p. 263. 
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could in due course be troubled by similar cleavages. In 
1984 President Amin Gemayal canceled the 17 May 1983 
Israeli-Lebanese withdrawl Agreement. This was followed by 
Israel's withdrawl in 1985 from most Lebanese territories, 
Syria re-established the legemony in Lebanese in 
1984, that had been shaken in 1982. Syria is still 
supporting the Lebanese government and the Lebanese Muslim 
(Shi'ite community). She has encouraged them to demand an 
end to Israeli occupation of their country. In the wake of 
the recent Gulf crisis, president Asad found it opportune 
to consolidate Syrian influence in Lebanon. Lebanon is 
virtuallynow under indirect Syrian control. 
The Syrian Concept of Peaceful Settlement 
Since the Israel-Egypt peace treaty the most 
immediate military threat Israel perceives from the north 
from Syria. Syria believes that if all the Arab parties 
concerned act in unision they can recover their territories 
in the long run. A separate peace treaty of one country 
with Israel, especially a strong one, would leave the other 
party in a position where they could neither fight a war 
nor negotiate for peace. In this context, Syrian leaders 
39. Ali, Saliman, Israeli Security and Arab Security, 
Al fnarfa Journal, No. 250, January 1983, 
pp. 25-37 TArabic); see also Special 
document Lebanese-Israeli troops withdrawl 
agreement. May 17, 1989, Journal of Palestine 
Studies, Vol. XII, No.4, Summer 1983, 
pp. 91-101. 
40. Shan Nan, The Reagan Administration Middle East 
Policy, Survival, Vol. XXVI, No.3, May/June 
1984, p . m . 
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believe that any future war with Israel will depend 
primarily on their military strength. The idea of a 
strategic balance with Israel is based on the nation that 
only military strength can provide the Arabs with the 
bargaining power to negotiate an acceptable peace with 
Israel and the deterrent capability to guarantee peace once 
achieved. Hence Syria's position had long been that 
negotiations with Israel should only be conducted when it 
had reached strategic parity with Israel (encompassing 
military, technical and economic factors and the support of 
the Soviet Union to balance American support for Israel). 
Syria has maintained that there is no point in negotiating 
with Israel from a position of weakness because Israel 
would then dictate its terms. 
President Asad stated in a speech on March 1972 
that "we support the Security Council Resolutions when 
interpreted as providing for the withdrawl of the enemy 
from the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and as a 
confirmation of the rights of the Palestinian people." 
In April 1987, during'President Asad's visit to Moscow a 
joint Soviet-Syrian statement was issued which called for a 
collective efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East. It 
specially referred to the holding of an International 
Conference under the auspices of the U.N. as a means to 
41. Yorke, n.l., p.302. 
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achieve it. Syria insists that negotiations should take 
place within an international peace conference as the Arab 
world would be put to a disadvantages if Israel negotiated 
with each state individually. Syria is essential to a 
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflit as is the P.L.O. 
Syria believe that she can not negotiate on behalf of the 
occupied territories, to solve the West Bank problem. 
In the 1973 October war Syria failed to win back 
the Golan, and had lost additional land before the 
ceasfire. In Israel, there is a broad national consensus 
that the Golan Heights should under no circumstances return 
to Syria. An Israeli minister said that "before talks 
begin between Israel and Syria, Syrian President Asad would 
have to accept two condition: that no Syrian soldiers will 
be there and that the Jewish settlements will not only 
43 
remain but expand in natural development. The decline 
in the Soviet Union's international position and stature; 
the waning of Soviet-American completion and the 
improvement in soviet-Israeli relations; all weakened 
Syria's standing. 
Syria has been the mainstay of Soviet influence in 
the region, but as early as 1987 she understood very well 
that she had to look elswhere. Syria had begun to look 
42. Ibid., p. 303. 
43. Jordan Times, 12 June 1991, p.l. 
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towards U.S. and toward Egypt. On 4 December 1983, when 
American Aircraft attacked Syrian positions in Lebanon, 
Syrian shot down three U.S. aircraft over Lebanon. It was 
a humiliating blow to U.S.'s prestige as for the first time 
an Arab country had shot down U.S.' aircraft and taken U.S. 
pilots prisoners. The U.S. had imposed sanctions on 
Syria in 1986 after Syrian diplomates were accused of 
aiding in the planting of a bomb abroad an Israeli airliner 
at London's Heathrow airport. Subsequently the U.S. 
restored diplomatic relations with Syria in August 1987. 
The Gulf war has shown that Syria is closer to the West 
than to the U.S.S.R. is political ideology but not in 
military affairs. During the Gulf war Syria agreed to join 
the international military coalition that was organised by 
46 the U.S. and its Arab allies to threaten Iraq. 
44. I. Rabinovich, External Pressures, International 
Strains: The Middle East in 1990, The RUSI 
Journal. Vol.135, No.4, Winter, 195T51 p.45. 
45. Saad Elshazly, The Arab Military Option, American Mideast 
Research, Sanfrancisco, 1986, p. 124. 
46. Syria joined Egypt and Saudi Arabia in what became 
the case of anti-Saddam coalition in the Arab 
World, for two main reasons: First, Saudi 
Financial transfers to Syria have been 
considerable for some time and have been 
especially important in defraying the costs 
of the expensive Syrian military operation 
in Lebanon. Second, ideological conflicts and 
personal rivalry between Asad and Saddam. 
This dispute reflects a competition for 
subregional leadership. Syria subsequent 
support for Khomeini's Iran in the Iran-Iraq 
war and its bitter condemnation of Iraq for 
attacking an Islamic country. For the history 
of Syrian-Iraqi relations over the past two 
decades. See Elberhard, Kienic, Baath V. 
Baath: Conflict Between Syria and Iraq 1968-
1989, Tauris, London, 1990. 
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Since the end of the October war 1973, the 
relations have been very difficult between Syria and Egypt. 
They got worsened after the Camp David accord. Syri 
re-establish diplomatic relation with Egypt in December 
1989. Relations had been broken by Syria 11 years earlier 
in response to Egypt signing the Camp David Accords. At 
present, President Asad unconditionally accepted a 
compromise formula for Mideast talks, but Syria emphasizes 
that Middle East peace settlement would be impossible 
unless Israel withdrawn from the Arab territories and 
recognizes Palestinian rights. 
The Jordan River 
Jordan River is unique with a twofold distinction 
of nature and history. In the First World War, the 
southern Jordan valley was part of the front line in 
Palestine. This portion of the river course consequently 
underwent detailed re-plotting in the topographical war-
maps of Palestine. 
The Jordan from its exit from lake Tiberias in the 
north to its debouchure into the Dead Sea in the South, 
hereafter referred to as the Lower Jordan, follows the axis 
of the central part of the great Rift valley along which 
the Lower Jordan winds, its course. It is called by various 
47. Jordan Time, 23 April 1991, p.2. 
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names in the regional geography of Palestine commonly by 
the name of Ghor (Arabic) or the Trough (Bighat Hayarden in 
Hebrew).^^ 
The river Jordan is the collecting stream of a 
large endoreic area which comprises a considerable portion 
of Western Palestine Its catchment area in Eastern 
Palestine is about tnree times bigger than that of the 
drainage area of more than two-thirds of the Palestine.Its 
two intermediate lakes. Lake Hula which has almost 
disappeared during the past few years owing to artificial 
drainage; and Lake Tiberias naturally divides the Jordan 
Rift valley into three major parts: The Jordan valley from 
its main sources at the foot of the Jabal Al-sheikh Masif 
upto lake Hula, the very short section from the Hula to 
Lake Tiberias in which the river attains its maximum 
gradient and the Lower Jordan Valley from Lake Tiberias to 
the Dead Sea is 105 km. in length. The catchment area of 
49 the river within these limits is about 13,6000 sq. km. 
The Jordan river is one of the smaller perennial 
rivers of the Middle East. It holds a key position in the 
48. Isaac Sehattner, The Lower Jordan Valley: A Study 
in the Eluviomorphology " of an Arid Region, 
Magiies Press, the Hebrew University,Jerusalem 
1962, p.13. 
49. Ibid., p. 24. 
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future development of both Israel and Jordan. The river 
is formed by the union of three main head streams near the 
village of Sde Nehemia about two and half miles inside the 
extreme northern border of Israel at 270 feet above sea 
level. These three head streams are the Dan, the Banias, 
and the Hasbani. The course and behaviour of these head 
streams have become an important factor in the development 
of the Jordan water dispute. 
The Dan is the largest and most Steadiest of the 
head streams of the river. It is fed entirely by springs 
and carries only a negligible quantity of run-off water 
during the rainy season. The sources of the Dan are inside 
Israeli territory. A number of springs at the foot of 
Jabal Al-sheikh (Mount Herman) near the Syrian village of 
Banias are the source of the second head stream called as 
Banias. It flows from about a mile in Syrian territory 
before entering Israel, a short distance south-east of 
village of Dan. The Hasbani is largely a seasonal stream. 
Its head is well inside Lebanon, at the north western foot 
of Jabal Al-sheikh about thirty miles from the Israeli 
border. The Hasbani after flowing about one and a half 
miles on Syrian territory enters Israel from Syria and not 
51 directly from Lebanon. 
50. Moshe Brawer, The Geographical Background of the 
Jordan Water Dispute, in Charles A. Fisher, 
(ed.), Essays in Political Geography, Mithuen 
and Co. Ltd., London, 1968, p.228. 
51. Ibid., p. 229, 
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The Jordan Water dispute had taken a serious turn 
in 1920s and attracted much international attention. 
Weizman, the Zionist leader sent a letter to Lord Curzon, 
then British Foreign Secretary on October 30, 1920 talking 
about the storage of ' the Jordan River Waters in Lake 
Tiberia.^^ In March 1951 Israel had moved bulldozers and 
military units into the demilitarized zone on the Syrian 
border. Despite the protests of the U.N. observers in the 
area and the U.S. State Department, Israel began draining 
Lake Hula which is part of the Jordan River System. Syrian 
villages were fixed upon by the Israelis though the Syrian 
troops moved closer to the border, they did not 
retaliate. 
Utilization of the waters of the Jordan valley has 
been hindered since 1948 by the Political difficulties of 
the area. Four states, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Israel 
control the Jordan catchment. Although a number of schemes 
for the national utilization of the water resources of the 
region have been proposed, none have been implemented. Each 
state has gone ahead with its own plans often to the 
detriment of other nations. The discussion took place 
52. Mahamoud Riyadh, Israel and the Arab Water in 
Historical Perspective, Israel and Arab Water 
and International Symposium, Amman, 25-26 
February 1984, Ithaca Press, London, 1985, 
p.11. 
53. Stephen Green, Taking Side: America's Secret 
Relations with a Militant Israel, William 
Morrow and Company, New York, r584, p.78. 
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between Israel and the adjoining Arab States (Lebanon, 
Syria, Jordan) in 1950s, to reach on understanding as to 
low the waters of the river Jordan might be most fairly 
allocated amongst the four states. However, a number of 
proposals and plans failed to resolve the water dispute. 
After the occupation of the Arab West Bank and 
Golan in 1967 Israel was able to control the Jordan 
tributaries frustrating any Arab Project to exploits about 
557o of the water available in the Jordan basin although the 
American Johnston Plan that was submitted in the fifties 
did not give Israel more than 387o of these waters. Today, 
Jordan has become unable to utilize more than 10% of the 
basin waters, despite the fact that the Johnston plan 
allocated about half of the basin water to Jordan. Israel 
and Jordan are trying to prevent new hostilities resulting 
from worsening water shortages. 
At the core of the Middle East's water problems 
are populations in Syria and Jordan, growing at rates close 
to 30% a year, while Israel bulges with the huge influx of 
Soviet immigrants. Whatever their faith all are reliant on 
the same complex of limited water supplies from the Jordan, 
Yarmuk, and Litani rivers and aquifers that lie below the 
water-shed between the occupied West Bank and Israel, 
waters that are not easily shared. 
54. Hassan bin Talal, Israel and Arab Water',' in Mahmoud 
Riyadh, Israel and the Arab Water in Historical Pers-
pective, Israel and Arab Water, An International Sym-
posiiora, Amman 25-26 February 1984 Ithaca Press,London, 
1985, p.l. 
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Ellas Salameh a specialist at Jordan University 
predicted that "there was not enough water. It was a zero-
sum Issue with the population being big for the water 
resources. By 1995 the situation would be critical". 
In July 1990 King Hussein of Jordan community on wafer 
problem said that "the needs within' this area, the 
limitations of what Is available even In terms of water 
males It Impossible to see how everyone Is going to fit in 
without something happening". King Hussein and Crow Prime 
Hassan also have been threatened that the water dispute 
with Israel could result in war. 
At present, Israel takes 800 million cubic meters 
of water from Jordan river each year. The Jordan's total 
annual flow is only 1450 million cubic meters. Israel has 
plans to further exploit the rivers feed the Jordan. The 
"Jerusalem Post" reported in April 1984 a statement by 
Israel's Water Commissioner Zemah Ylshal that Israel would 
55. Jordan Times, 20 March 1991, p.5. Any Increase in 
population will ultimately result in compli-
cating the situation and reducing the 
percentage water coverage in the area. See 
Ellas Salameh, Water and other Resources in 
the Middle East and their Development and 
Strategic Importance upto 2002, APS 
Conference, 2-5 October 1989, Larnilca. 
Cyprus, pp. 1-19. 
56. Haaritz, (Tel Aviv) 15 July 1990, p.4. 
57. Saad Elshazly, The Arab Military Option, American 
Mlddeast Research, San Francisco, 1986, p.31. 
91 
begin this summer to take all the water from the yarmak 
river to which it was entitled under agreement with 
58 Jordan. Israel by use of price wants to exploit control 
all the headwaters of the river Jordan which lie in 
Jordanian, Syrian and Lebanese territories and denying 
these countries their rightful share in the water of Jordan 
river. The sharing of water between these countries has 
been one of the factors causing rivalry among them. 
Israel's Water Policies in the Occupied territories 
Israel is perpetually in need of water resources in 
order to meet the ever increasing demand for water-caused 
by the constant influx of immigrants and the establishment 
of new settlements. After taking over river waters, and 
exhausting all the surface water resources, Israel turned 
to exploiting the subterranean waters in the West Bank, 
claiming that Israel has right to these waters as they are 
important sources feeding the sub-terranean waters in the 
plains of Israel. In West Bank, Israel needs to use the 
greatest possible amount of water in order to meet the need 
of the settlements there. 
Since 1967, Israel has seized important water 
resources in the West Bank. The first of the major water 
sources secured by the Israelis in 1967 was the water from 
58. Ibid., p. 51. 
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the catchment basin of the West Bank, itself. An estimate 
annual volume of some 200 million cubic metres of West Bank 
water flows into the coastal reservoirs that had already 
begun to be exploited by the Israelis in the early 
59 1950s. The seizer of the West Bank was the prerequisite 
to ensure that Arab water would remain available for 
Israeli consumption. By controlling the West Bank Israeli 
military administration can guarantee that the Arab 
inhabitants do not develop this indigenous water resources. 
The Director General of Israeli Prime Minister's 
Office Dr. Ben-Elissar, concluded "that the state of Israel 
must continue to control the water resources in the 
territories both because of the danger to water rivers 
inside the Green line and because it will be impossible to 
establish new Israeli settlements in these territories 
fif) 
without control and supervision of the water resources". 
Since the 1967, Israeli National Water Authority, 
has been responsible for the public water supply in the 
occupied territories. During the first years of the 
occupation, the control of water was a key factor to the 
political and economic control of the territories. Israeli 
attitude towards the poilitical future West Bank and Gaza 
strip, its rejection of the establishment of a Palestinian 
59. Thomas, Stauffer, Arab Water in Israeli Calculation., The 
Benefits of War and the Cost of Peace, Israel and Arab 
Water in Mahmoud Riyadh, n. 54, p-. 76. 
60. Uri Davis, Antonia E.L. Maks and John Richardson, Israel's 
Water Policies, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.1, 
n. 9, 1979-80, p. 31. 
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state those appears to be partially attributable to the 
water factor in these Palestinian territories. It does not 
want to relinquish its control water resources in occupied 
territories. Moshe Dayan has said that "Israel will 
continue to control the water resources in Judea and 
Samaria (West Bank) which constitute the main water 
resources for the coastal plain the Arabs in Judea and 
f\ 1 
Samaria would not get more water .than they had today". 
Before 1967 Israel had been pumping away from the 
West Bank's water supply, some 500 million cubic metres 
annually by means of artisian wells drilled in Israel. 
This constituted approximately one-third of Israel's annual 
water consumption before 1967 and it constituted five-
sixths of the West water. 
No well can be sunk by a Palestinain in the West 
Bank without first obtaining a permit from the 
representatives of the Water Commissioner at the military 
government offices. According to Israel's military order 
158 of 1 October 1967; no water installation was allowed 
without a licence from the military commander. Thus the 
Israeli Area Military Commander has complete and absolute 
control over access to water throughout the occupied 
territories. 
61. Ibid., p. 20. 
62. Israel's Policy on the West Bank Water Resources 
United Nations, New York, July 1980, p.3. 
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There were only five cases of Palestinians being 
allowed to sink new wells for drinking water during the 
ft "^ 1967 to 1987. Not a single application for the drilling 
of wells for irrigation has been approved since 1967. 
Israeli's water policy in the West Bank has devastating 
effect on neighbouring Arab springs and wells. 
When the Israeli settlement of Mehola was 
established in 1968 near the villages of Bardalah and Tel 
El-Bada, Mokorot adviced the settlement authority that the 
drilling of a planned well to supply water for the 
settlemnt would adversely affect the five wells and spring 
used by neighbouring Arab villages. Fully aware of this 
report, the Israeli's dug the well. Consequently 
Palestinian farms have not had enough water ever since. 
An Arab muncipality, Ramallah, for example has not 
been allowed to drill wells unless they supply new Jewish 
settlements or linkup their municipal systems to the 
Israeli network which gets its water supply from the 
64 ground water of the city of Ramalah itself. Dr. Hisham 
Awartani, Chairman of the Department of Economics at Al 
Najab National University in Nablus (1978) presented an 
insightful study of Israel's water policies in the West 
Bank. His conclusions are follows: 
63. David Mcdowall, Palestine and Israel, the Uprising 
and Beyond, I.B. Tauris and Co., London,1989, 
p. 279 
64. Israel' s Pol i_cy_ on the West Bank Water Resources, 
U.N. r'New'York. July 1980. 
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1. In the West Bank, the total number of artisian 
wells is 331 of which 17 have been drilled by the 
Israel Water Company (Mekorot) in the Jordan Valley 
to serve Israeli settlements in the area; 
2. Following the 1967 occupation, 12 Arab wells have 
drived up, many others in the Jordan valley (mostly 
in the northern part) are suffering a declining 
water level and increasing salinity; 
3. The total volume of water discharged from 314 Arab 
wells amounted in 1977-78 to 33 million cubic 
metres whereas the 17 Israeli wells in the Jordan 
valley discharged 14.1 million cubic metres. 
Water consumption of the average Palestinian family 
in the West Bank is estimated to be less than a quarter of 
that consumed by the average Israeli family. Abedel Rahman 
Tamimi, Director of the Palestinian Hydrology groups, says 
"since 1967 Arab residents have been denied permission to 
drill for water while Israel has sunk dozens of mostly deep 
wells for settlements and for military camps.... All Jewish 
settlements in the territories were supplied with running 
water. On the other hand, 51 per cent of Arab villages and 
hamlets are deprived of such a service and are obliged to 
rely on rain and spring water." He further stated that 
65. Ibid., p.13. 
66. The Independent, 12 October 1991. 
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"in some areas settlements had swimming pools, while 
Palestinian villages next door had a shortage of drinking 
water. No one could accept that he did not have water to 
ft 7 
drink and his neighbour had a swimming pool". 
The inequality of water resources allocated to jews 
and Arabs is clearly . visible in 1990 plan according to 
which about 60 million cubic meters of water would be 
available to 39 Israeli agricultural settlements while 90 
million would be available to 400 Palestinian villages. As 
a result the Palestinian agriculture sector has been shaken 
and many people deserted their land. 
In the Israeli occupied territories the 
Palestinians have occasionally protested against Israel's 
exploitation of under ground water resources supplement 
supplies inside 'Israel proper' and irrigate Jewish 
settlements. The Palestinian have little power to do any 
thing but watch hundreds of their pre-1967 Springs and 
wells gradually turn saline and then dry up while in the 
vicinity employees of Israeli water authorities have highly 
sophisticated water pumping and transport systems to 
irrigate the Jewish settlement in the West Bank. Israel's 
exploitation of the West Bank waters at the expense of its 
67 . Ibid., p.15. 
68. Israel's Policy on the West Bank Water Resources, 
U.N., n. 64, pp. 14-15. 
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Palestinian inhabitants has led to a conflict between 
Israeli authorities and Palestinian peoples. The General 
Assembly of the U.N. passed a resolution on 19th December 
1983 (Resolution No. 144 accepted by 120 countries, 
rejected by 2 countries, Israel and U.S.) condemning Israel 
for its exploitation of the natural resources of the 
occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories and 
calling upon all states, international organisations and 
other institutions not to recognise or cooperate with or 
assist in any manner in any measures under-taken by Israel 
to exploit these resources or to effect any changes in the 
structure of these territories. Israels water policy is 
clearly discriminating against both the Palestinian peoples 
of West bank and Gaza strip and peoples of Jordan and 
Syria. 
Iraq and Israel 
Iraq shares no borders with Israel. However, both 
are at conflict with each other. Historically Iraq has 
played a leading role in rejecting any agreement with 
Israel. Iraq participated in 1948 war and refused to enter 
into armestic negotiations after the cessation of 
hostilities. Iraqi forces had represnts a serious threat 
to Israel's eastern front. Iraq supplied a squarson of 
Hunter jets to Egyptian air fields a few months before the 
commencement of the fighting in the 1973 October war. 
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During the war the Iraqi 3rd Armouned Division, an esti-
mated 20,000 men and 320 tanks, deployed itself in the 
Central Golan Sector and participated in the 16 October 
attacks against Israeli positions. An armoured division 
and an infantry division were also deployed with 280 tanks, 
and Iraqi MIGs and pilots began operating over the Golan 
69 
Heights at the initial phase of the war. Israel worries 
about the ballistic missiles capacity which Iraq demons-
trated during the Iran-Iraq war. Iraq's military potential 
gave Israeli military planners a cause for concern. Ahason 
leveran of Tel Aviv University's Jaffe centre for strategic 
studies argued that "the way the war (Iran-Iraq war) ended, 
Iraq had a sense of victory and that was bad for 
T 1 -.70 Israel. 
Israeli warplanes bombed an Iraqi nuclear reactor 
near the capital Baghdad in July 1982. Israeli officials 
said the Iraqis were working on component of an atom bomb 
at half a dozen underground sites around the country. 
On February 16, 1990 Israel's alarm bells rang with the 
announcement regarding the development an Iraq-Jordan 
defence understanding. Jordan to bolster its eastern front 
69. R.C. Gupta, American Arms in West Asia, Puneet Pub-
lic at ion7~DeTHr7~rM5~~prT7B^: 
70. Time, 1 August 1988, 
71. Time, 9 April 1990, p.19. 
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in the event of a military confrontation with Israel, it 
developed a strategic relationship with Iraq. Israel 
watched Iraqi Army division commanders visit Jordanian 
units stationed along the river Jordan, their purpose being 
72 to view the terrain for battle. Saddam Hussain announced 
on April 2, 1990 that he possessed a binary chemical weapon 
and asserted that if Israel was to strike Iraq with its 
nuclear weapons Iraq would retaliate with chemical weapons. 
"By God we will make fire (chemical weapons) set up half of 
Israel if it tries to strike Iraq a second time", was 
73 Saddam Hussein threat. 
President Saddam Hussein established the link 
between the Palestinian and Kuwait problem on August 12, 
1990. He insisted on the linking up of Iraq's occupation 
of Kuwait with Israeli occupation of Gaza strip. West Bank, 
the Golan heights, Southern Lebanon and East Jerusalem. 
Saddam Hussein called upon all Arabs to liberate Jerusalem 
and renewed his threat to attack Israel with missiles and 
chemical weapons. He declared that if Israel did not 
vacate the occupied Arab territories then it would have to 
suffer quick retaliatory action from Iraq and other Arab 
72. Newsweek, 13 August 1990, p.11. 
73. Zachary T. Irwin, Israel: An Aspiring Hegemon, in 
David J. Myers, (ed.), Regional Hegemoous: 
Threat Perception and Strategic Response, 
Westview Press, San-francisco and other,1991, 
p. 84. 
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countries. He stated that the wounds of captive Jerusalem 
could be only healed by action to free it from Israeli 
control. 
Prime Minister Yitzhak. Shamir said "that Israel 
would never accept a link between the settlement of the 
Gulf Crisis to its withdrawl from Arab land occupied after 
the 1967 Middle East war. He stated that Israel had been 
asked more than once to withdraw from these territories and 
other areas in Israel and she had refused. And Israel 
would continue to do so in the future." Iraqi President 
Saddam Hussein had said that he would attack Israel first 
should the war erupt in the Gulf. Israel, worried by 
Saddam Hussein threats of a chemical attack, started the 
biggest distribution of gas mask to civilians. Israel also 
put its surface-to-air missiles or rare display (Hawk 
missiles perched on a hilltop in the West Bank and their 
7 fi 
electronics arms were ready for any intruder). 
On January 17, 1991 the Gulf War broke out, 39 
Iraqi Scud missiles (all Iraqi raids were conventional and 
not chemical) had been launched against Israeli town cities 
causing extensive damage. This was the first time since 
74. The Independent, 10 October 1990, p.l. 
75. The Independent, 17 February 1991, p.6. 
76. David, Segal Desert Storm and Division Air Defense, 
Armed Forces Journal International, May,1991, 
P.34. 
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the 1948 war that Arabs had succeeded in striking at 
Israel's civilian home front. The threat from Iraq's AI 
Hussein missiles and chemical weapons however was something 
the Israelis had never faced before. Iraqi missiles attack 
has created stress, tension and a psychological impact on 
the Israelis. During the conflict 39 Iraqi Scud missiles 
were launched against Israel in 18 different attacks 
causing 12 deaths, over 1000 injuries and damaging or 
destroying over 10,500 dwelling or offices. The Gulf 
crisis and conflict cost Israel some $ 3 billion. The oil 
bill increased insurance rates to cover imports and the 
damage inflicted by 39 Iraqi missiles added upto another 
billion dollars. An army spokeman put the damage at some 
$ 200 million.^^ 
Israel has taken a hard look at its security 
doctrine after the Gulf war and asked itself a number of 
key questions about its future security. What impact do 
those Scuds have on Israeli thinking about the relationship 
between security and the continued retention of occupied 
territories. The Iraqi missiles firings during the Gulf 
war showed that Israel's existing strategic depth does not 
provide protection against all types of attacks. Israel 
77. The Independent, 4 March 1991, p.8. 
78. The Independent, 2 March 1991, p.8 
102 
has discovered that the addition of territory does not 
79 
necessarily increase its deterrent capability. 
Iraqi Hussein/Scud attacks- have put anti-tactical 
ballistic missile defense at the top of Israel's defence 
priorities. U.S. and Israeli patriots based in Israel 
failed to destroy some of Al Hussein missile war heads. 
Israel is now looking for a greater investment in anti-
missiles defence because it knows that the Arab will at 
some point be able to arm their missiles with nonconven-
tional warheads and more sophisticated missiles will be 
for more accurate and can be directed at strategic target 
such as airfields and other vital facilities. Israel will 
undoubtedly be sinking more money into the development of 
the Arrow anti ballistic missile. According to high-ranking 
Israel Defence force officials, in the long run the 
ballistic missile threat will play a decisive role in the 
80 
next war. 
Development of Israel spy statllites is now on the 
national agenda. Israel has been entirely dependent on U.S 
reconnaissance satellites for real/time attack warnings 
during the Gulf war, particularly during Iraq missle 
79. Zeev Schiff, Israel After the War, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, 
no. 2, Spring 1991, pp. 28-2^: 
80. Scotty Fisher, Israel's Defence Minister, Military 
at odds over stake in Arrow Project, Armed 
Forces Journal International, December 1990, 
p. 30, and June 1991, p. 30. Arrow is being 
designed to have a 70 km. range and an 
altitude of 30 kms. against targets with a 
range of 1000 km. 
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attacks on Israel. During the war U.S. agreed to rely the 
signal directly from the early-warning satellites to a 
ground station in Israel, thus giving the Israelis a 5 
minutes early warning. Israeli officials say that in 
future they can not rely on satellite intelligence from a 
foreign country. Israel has already launched two 
experimental satellites of the Offeq series and a third 
• 11 i_ 1 1- J -^ • ^ *- 81 Capitalizing 
will be launched sometimes in near future. ^ ^ 
on the previous launches of two experimental satellites. 
Defense Minister Moshe Arens confirmed that "Israel would 
launch a satellite with intelligence-gathering capability. 
The Israeli satellite could be used to spy on neighbours 
such as Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. He added that if 
they had it operating (last August) they could have watched 
82 Iraq, build up it forces for the invasion of Kuwait." 
Israel did not stand alone when faced with a grave 
military threat during the Gulf War. Israel was bound to 
be rewarded by the West for sharing restraint in the face 
of Iraqi Scud missiles. U.S. military personnel were being 
dispatched to the Jewish state to man unpecified numbers of 
patriot air defence system. The U.S. was also pledging 
81. See Space Technology, Idsa. Defence Newsletter, 
Vol. 8, No.8, 15 April 1991, p.416 (Institute 
for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi'). 
82. Ibid., p. 416. 
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83 
several million dollars aid to Israel. The immediate 
U.S. aid to Israel was in the form- of batteries of patriot 
missiles, the services of its satellites, warnings of 
missiles launching and the heavy bombing of the Iraqi 
launching sites throughout the war. Israel asked the U.S. 
administration for aid of 13 billion dollars over and above 
the 4.75 billion dollars that U.S. promised to Israel. The 
additional aid included three billion dollars for war 
84 
compensation for actual and expected dangers to Israel. 
83. Jordan Times, 3 October 1990, p.2. 
84. Maharastra Herald, 24 January 1991, p.l 
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CHAPTER IV 
ISRAEL, PALESTINIAN AND PLO 
In January 1964 a summit conference was held in 
Cairo. It passed several resolutions about the Arab 
Israeli conflict, the most important of which was the est-
ablishment of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) 
and the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA). The PLO was a 
coalition of eight Palestinian groups all having the 
objective of establishing an independent state of Palestine 
Both Organisations were headed by Ahmed Alshukeiry." A 
Palestine National Congress was convened at Jerusalem on 
May 28, 1964 and it proclaimed the establishment of the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation, the Congress also 
adopted a national charter which chalked out the Palesti-
nian national programme. Yasser Arafat took over the 
2 
chairmanship of PLO in 1969. 
1. Yair Evron, The Middle East Nations, Super Power 
and Wars" Elex, London, 1973, p.54. 
2. Arafat had been born Abdel Rahman Abdel Raouf 
Arafat Alqudwa Al Husseini in December 1919 
on his mother's side. He was connected to 
the Husseini a family prominent in the Sunni 
Muslim Community in Jerusalem. 
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The Aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war 
witnessed the sudden growth of Palestinian armed assistance 
in the Middle East and from 1968 to 1972 the Palestinians 
became important political actors in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Since the 1967 war, or to be more precise since 
large-scale PLO guerrilla activities began in the spring of 
1969 the rate of Israeli casualittes both military and 
civilian has risen. The guerrilla operations it was 
thought that it escalated would have pose serious problems 
for Israeli army to tackle them. 
The Fedayeen raids were a major source of concern 
to Israel in the 1970s. A new policy was adopted in 
January 1979 which allowed the Israeli defence forces to 
attacks any known Fedayeen concentration or training base 
before a political cross-border raid could be launched. 
The P.L.O used Lebanon its staging area for such attacks. 
This use of Lebanon by P.L.O. brought widespread Israeli 
retaliatory destruction to the people of Lebanon and 
Palestinians as well. Israeli retaliatory operations led to 
the restraining of P.L.O. guerrilla activities and forced 
P.L.O. supportive countries like Syria and Jordan to put a 
3. W.B. Quandt and other, The Politics of Palestinian 
Nationalism, University of California Press, 
California, 1973, p. 149. 
4. A. Ducan, The Military Threat to Israel, in Charles 
Tripp, (ed.). Regional Security in the Middle 
East, Gower, London, 1984, p. 107. 
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chek on such P.L.O. operations in order to stop the 
retaliatory actions of Israel. After the Israeli invasion 
of Lebanon in 1982, P.L.O. moved its headquarters to Tunis. 
Moreover, P.L.O nationalism also declined in terms of its 
credibility as was the case in 1970s. Actually Palestinians 
never had a strong and cohesive leadership. Divisions 
among the different groups within the P.L.O. most offers 
came on the surface. Abu Lyad once said that "We had 
twelve organisations which meant twelve leaderships, twelve 
different strategies and twelve guns pointing in twelve 
5 
different directions, from all that our HIS grew". 
The PLO has deviated from its past policy of armed 
struggle aimed at dismontling the Israel towards a more 
moderate political stance today. The PLO began to seek 
the negotiated settlement of Palestine question. This is 
being reflected in the adjustment of Long terms objective 
liberating all of Palestine to the narrow objective of 
establishing a West-Bank-Gaza State, PLO's softening 
attitude has been challenged by an Islamic political move-
ment Hamas which believe that there is no room for reconci-
lation with me Jewish State and confrontation with Israel 
should be total and comprehensive and Israel should be 
5. P. Dasgupta, Cheated by the World: The Palestine 
Experience, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1988, 
p. 179. 
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fought with all available means. Moreover since the 
uprising in occupied territories in 1987. This movement 
has become increasingly powerful political force, 
demanding the restoration of nothing less than the 
mandatory Palestine as a national homeland and publicly 
rejecting international initiatives on exchanging Land for 
peace. The goal of an Islamic state in all of the 
Palestine, in view of Israeli perspective, constitutes an 
immediate threat to Israel's desire to control the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. West Bank military commander Amran 
Mitza said that "If there is something that could bother us 
in the future it is a religious reawakening which has 
began in the Gaza area and which is going on and liable to 
intensify". With PLC's military and political weakness 
and the emergence of Islamic resistence movement in 
occupied territories and continued absence of a solutionto 
the Palestinian question due to Israel's apprehensions 
about the establishment of independent Palestine homeland 
the strategic instability in the region will continue to 
prevail. 
The State of Palestine 
The West Bank (2,200 square miles) is some 85 miles 
long. Its greatest width is under 40 miles and its 
narrowest at Jerusalem is under 20 miles. No point on the 
6. David McDowall, Palestine and Israel: The Uprising 
and Beyond, I.B. Tauris and Co. Publishers, 
London, 1989, p.109. 
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West Bank falls outside a 25 mile radius from the nearest 
point along the Israel frontier and most of it falls 
within a 20 miles radius of the frontiers. The West Bank 
lies on the central massive of Palestine. The West Bank is 
located between Jordan and the Dead Sea. The strip of 
Israeli land bordering the Mediterianian sea is referred by 
Israel to as a Judea and Samaria. It was annexed by king 
Abdullah of Jordan in December 1948, but Israel it captured 
in 1967. The Gaza Strip (150 square miles) is clearly less 
vital than the West Bank. It is part of the Mediterranean 
coastal plain. Gaza is fifty miles south west of the West 
Bank and separated politically from it since 1948. The 
Gaza Strip was also conquered by Israel in 1967. 
The idea of a Palestinian state in Gaza and the 
West Bank alongside Israel did not appear on the 
Palestinian nationalist agenda until shortly before the 
October 1973 war. The initiative came from Nayef Hawatma's 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), it 
was not formally adopted, however, until 1977 by the PLC's 
Q 
policy determining body, the Palestinian National Council, 
7. M.A. Heller, A Palestinian State: The Implication 
for Israel, Havvard University Press, Havvard, 
1983, p.12. 
8. Scott Atran, Stones against the Iron Fist Terror 
within the nation: Alternating Structures of 
Violence and cultural identity in the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict, Politics and Society, 
Vol. 18, No.4, December 1990, p.485. 
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All Israeli Government have always been refusing to accept 
any argument or proposal that would lead to the formation 
of a Palestine State. Former Prime minister Golda Meir had 
emphasized that "There was no such thing as a Palestinian 
nation or people. When queried about the creation of a new 
Arab Palestinian state on the West Bank, she pointed out 
that it would be too small, only if it more part of Jordan 
9 
or Israel could the area remain viable. She also stated 
that : "There are now two countries: One Jewish and one 
Arab and there is no room for a third. The Palestinian 
must find the solution to the problem together with that 
Arab country, Jordan. A Palestinian state between us and 
Jordan can only became a base from which it will be even 
10 
more convenient to attack and destroy Israel". 
Yitzhak Rabin, Former Prime Minister has stated 
that "we are vigorously opposed to an independent Pales-
tinian state between Israel and Jordan... no third state 
11 
come into being" Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir 
9. Don Peretz, Arab Palestine, Phoenix or Phantom, in 
J. Norton Moore, (ed. ) , The Arab-Israeli 
Conflict, Princeton University Press, New 
Jersey, 1977, p.73. 
10. Golda Neir, My Life, Weidenfield and Nicolson, 
London, 1975, p.325. 
11. Yitzhak Rabin, Rabin Memories, Little, Brown and 
Company, Boston and Tontonto, 1979, p.294. 
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had maintained that Israel would not accept a Palestinian 
state it would not speak to the PLO. . . . or negotiate 
with it.-*-^  
It is important to keep in mind that Israeli 
authorities have never recognized the existence of a 
Palestine resistance movement. The guerrillas are 
"terrorists" "infiltrators" "Saboteurs", Palestinian 
gurrillas falling into Israeli hands are treated as 
criminals even though they may be wearing uniforms and 
belong to military units. 
Israeli leaders claim that a Palestinian State 
would pose a threat to Israeli security, and they fear that 
such a state would serve as a base area for continuing the 
military struggle. They believe that the return of the West 
Bank to Palestinians, for example, would mean the setting 
of Palestinian artillery along the whole of Israel's 
Mediterranean coastal strip, the most densety populated 
area in the country. In this context, Israel could not 
return West Bank and Gaza Strip to the Palestinians for 
13 
reasons of security. 
12. Jordan Times, 16-17 March 1989, p.7. 
13. Alvi Plascov, A Palestinian State: Examining the 
Alternatives, in Charles Tripp, (ed.) 
Regional Security in the Middle East, Cover, 
IISS, London, 1984, pp. 89-90. 
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Israel also fears that once a Palestinian State is 
established in the occupied territories, the Palestinian 
will ask for the recovery of the remaining parts of old 
Palestine now the State of Israel. Israel's vulnerable 
"Waist" is flat with no barriers between the Mediterranean 
and the foothills of the West Bank, at point this, "Waist" 
is only 9 to 15 miles wide. Most of Israelis population 
and most of her industrial infrastructure is concentrated 
in the narrowest part of this strip. 
In the Likud's eyes, the establishment of an 
independent Palestinian State in the occupied territories 
would mean opening up an insecure front. Prime Minister 
Shamir made it clear that "Israel will object to establish-
ment of another Palestinian State in the Gaza and in the 
area between Israel and Jordan and that Israel will not 
negotiate with the PLO." 
The Labour and Likud Parties have agreed to oppose 
any independent Palestinian State and rejected any idea of 
negotiating with the PLO because from Israel's point of 
view, the PLO means the political and physical annihilation 
of Israel. Since 1967 the occupied territories have formed 
14. Ibid., pp. 90-92. 
15. B. Reich, Israel Year of Transitian, Current 
History, Vol. 86, No. 517, February 1987, 
p. 71. 
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a major element in Israel's security concept. The West 
Bank is a critical buffer against a surprise attack. The 
Land itself creates strategic depth and Israeli settlement 
can provide a kind of early warning. Thus, from Israel's 
point of view, returning territories to the Arabs would 
virtually guarantee an attack. 
Aside from potential security threat to Israel, 
other Israeli interest may be adversely affected by the 
creation of an independent Palestinian State even if they 
remain non-belligerent. A Palestinian State would 
certainly prevent further Jewish settlements. These 
settlements serve Israel's military-security interests. 
Israel's economists estimated that $ 1 billion was spent on 
West Bank settlement between 1977 and 1981. The West 
Bank and Gaza have emerged as important markets for Israeli 
goods. By 1980 Israeli exports to the West Bank and Gaza 
rose enough to make these territories Israel's third 
largest export market after the U.S. and Europe, absorbing 
some $ 780 million worth of goods and producing a trade 
1 8 
surplus for Israel of $ 490 million. The West Bank Gaza 
workers in Israel constitute almost 35% of the Labour force 
of the territories. Nearly 120,000 Palestinians go to work 
16. Samuel U., Lewis, Israel: The Peres era and its 
Legacy, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 65, No.3, 1987, 
p. 685. 
17. Heller, n. 7. p.14. 
18. Bhagvandas, The Sound of Insurrection, Maharastra 
Herald, 20 March 1988, p.4. 
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each day into pre-1967 Israeli 45,000 workers from Gaza pay 
in taxes more than $ 17.5 millions that the Israeli govern-
19 
ment contributes to the area's budget. 
Israel has been drawing about 300 million cubic 
meters of water per year constituing about 187o of its total 
consumption, from the sub-terranean equifer that straddles 
the Israel- West Bank border. The West Bank also provides 
a major training area for the Israeli Defence Forces. In 
addition, control of the West Bank is a major asset in 
20 dealing with the problem of infiltration operations. 
It is clear to Israel that a peace settlement based 
on the creation of an independent Palestinian state in the 
occupied territories (West Bank and Gaza) to entails 
certain risks and costs to Israeli security and other 
interests. On July 30, 1980 Israel formally annexed 
Jerusalem and publicly proclaimed, Jerusalem as a permanent 
capital of Israel. And Israel never vowes to give up an 
inch of Jerusalem because, the city of Jerusalem has 
considerable importance: Politically, Strategically and 
economically Jerusalem was the centre of Palestinian 
political activity and under the Israeli annexation 
Jerusalem has become a Palestinian national symbol. That is 
19. F. J. Khergamvala, Palestine Agency, Frontline 
6-19 February 1988, p.35. 
20. Heller, n.7, p. 15. 
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why Palestinian declared East Jerusalem as their capital. 
Jerusalem geographically a part of the West Bank, has a 
history of its own. This ancient city is sacred to the 
follower of major religious: Judism Christianity and Islam. 
Israel's generally believe that Jerusalem is their eternal 
capital. In other words, all Zionist Israelis remain 
committed to its retention as the United and external 
capital of Jewish people. 
Menacheam Begin declared in the Knesset: let all 
the members of the Security Council record that Jerusalem 
is our city, all it is under Israel's sovereignty, our 
eternal capital like Muslims, the question of Jerusalem 
for Israelis also is changed with sentiments and motions. 
It possesses unique problems, as it remains the corner-
stone of any comprehensive Middle East settlement. The PLO 
realised after about the 25 years of the conflcit that 
Israel's existence is inevitable. Therefore, the PLO has 
made a historic shift from a one-state solution to the two-
state solution whose terms would be a home for Israel 
behind secure boundries. Israel claims that such a state 
would be non-viable and irredentist becoming a base for 
terrorism and destablising forces which would endanger 
peace and security in the area. However, the Arabs believe 
that Israel must realize that a small Palestinian state 
would not represent a threat to Israel for may reason : 
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1. Palestinians are willing to discuss various 
formulas for special limited disarmanent zone, and 
International supervision and other agreements as 
part of a just comprehensive peace. 
2. The U.S. would not allow the situation to develop 
into Israel's military disadvantage. 
3. Israel would take pre-emptive military measures 
against the new state, should the new state allow 
Fedayeen to stage raids upon Israel from its 
territories. 
4. Israel would not tolerate the military buildup of 
such a State. 
5. When the Israelis once and for all decide what 
Israel want as their final and justified borders 
and when Israel will recognise the Palestinians 
right to self-determination discussion regarding 
mutual security arrangements, could proceed with a 
21 high possibility of accommodation. 
Israel has a mobilization manpower of 600,000, some 
4,288 tanks, 533 air craft and thousands of artillery 
pieces and missiles. The PLO has 10,000 men, a variety of 
hand guns, grenades, motors, stones and bottes, no tanks, 
22 
no aircraft. Therefore, it may be assumed that Israel's 
21. J.E. Mroz, Beyond Security : Private Perceptions 
among Arabs and Israelis, Pergamon Press, New 
York, 1980, p.102. 
22. See The Military Balance 1990-91, Brassey's, the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies. 
Autumn 1990, London, pp. 106-110. 
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army will remain the strongest military machine in the 
area. Thus, a Palestinian state could not militarily 
threaten Israel by itself. 
The Palestinian National Council declared an 
independent Palestinian State on .November 1988, according 
to the partition Resolution 181 of 1947 and formally 
accepted the Resolution 242 as a basis for negotiations. 
Thus, implicitly recognising Israel. In the view of this 
declaration, any agenda for negotiation will have to be 
based on the demand for self-determination rather than 
self-rule and on the borders in which the Palestinian State 
would be permitted to exist. Nothing else would bring the 
Palestinians to the negotiating table. In the West-Bank 
and Gaza, the establishment of a small Palestinian State 
would result in two possible developments: first, such a 
state would have to commit itself to maintaining peace, 
second, it would oppose any attempt to mount an attack 
against Israel through its territory. This would mean that 
in the event of war, fighting would take place within its 
boundaries and its population would be the first to 
P<r 23 
suffer. 
If Israel had agreed to accept an independent 
Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the PLO 
should have to accept the following Israeli conditions: 
23. Aryeh Shalev, The West Bank: Line of Defense 
Fraeger, New York, 1985, p.64. 
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(1) The most rigorous and detailed Israeli security 
measures must be guaranteed; 
(2) A Palestinian State will have no armed forces and 
its sovereignty will be restricted to the conduct 
of foreign affairs (Limited sovereignty for 
security); 
(3) A Palestinian State will be non-aligned; 
(4) Except Israeli forces, no military pressure will be 
allowed on the river's West Bank. In other words, 
there would be no security for a divided Israel and 
there can be no substitude for Israeli forces on 
the West Bank of the Jordan Rivers; 
(5) Jerusalem will never become an exclusively Arab 
capital; 
(6) Full recognition of Israel by all Arab moderate 
States and proclamation of the Arab League to 
renounce its struggle against Israel; 
(7) A Palestinian State would represent the end of Arah 
claims on Israel; 
(8) The negotiation between Israel and Palestinian 
should proceed in phases; 
(9) A Palestinian State should not contain all the 
Palestinian refugees who might wish to return; 
Israel need a genuine security arrangement with its 
neighbours supported by its chief ally the U.S. 
(10 
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and legitimized by the moderate Arab world and the 
international community. 
Negotiations between Israel and Palestnian must 
start with a prior understanding that the end of the 
process of ''Palestinian independence" does not constitute a 
perpetual danger to Israel. Palestinian statehood must be 
achieved only in strict conformity with Israeli security. 
Main issues must be taken into account, such as borders, 
Jewish settlements, Palestinian refugees, sovereignty, 
25 
security arrangements, Jerusalem and water resources. 
A Palestinian State in the occupied territories within the 
1967 frontiers in peaceful co-existence alongside Israel is 
the only conceptual option for long term solution to the 
problem; under such a conceptual framework Palestinian 
state would be viable on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
Without undertaking Israeli security inhibitions, the 
chances of coming into being a Palestinian State are very 
remote and bleak. 
Demography of Palestine and Jewish Immigration 
The Palestinians are divided into two main groups, 
the first, consist of those who live in the West Bank 
(Judah and Samaria); and the second in the Gaza Strip. 
24. Amos Perlmatter, Israel's Dilemma, Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 68, No.5, Winter 1989/W; pp.127-131. 
25. Da Oddie, Vision of Palestinian State along side 
Israel, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 135, No. 2, 
Summer, 1990, pp. 32-36. 
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The population has been increasing at a rapid rate in the 
occupied territories. West Bank had approximately 595,000 
inhabitants, some 22,500 of them were in twelve urban 
centres at the time when census was held after the six day 
war. The total urban proportion of the territorial 
population was 38 per cent. The population had increased 
by 40 per cent to 835,000 in 1987. In the twelve urban 
centres, the number of residents had swelled by 78 per cent 
to 400,000 and the over all urban proportion had expanded 
to 45 per cent. 
In 1985, over 510,000 people live in the crowded 
and impoverished Gaza Strip enclave, making it one of the 
most densety populated regions in the world with over 1300 
persons per square kilometer. On this number nearly 
360,000 lived in squalid refugees camps on the edge of 
27 despair. The population density is likely to be about 
2,000 persons per square kilometer by the end of the 
country. 
The non-Jewish population of Israel (almost all 
Arab) amounted to 639,000 or 16.3 per cent of the total 
26. Allen G. Noble and E. Efrat, Geography of the 
Intefada, Geogra 
July 1990, p. 29( 
phical Review, Vol.80, No.3, 
27. Valerie Yorke, Domestic, Politics and Regional 
Security -~Tordan, Syria and Israel: The end 
of an era. Book Field, Gower, Sydney, 1988, 
p. 183. 
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28 
Israel population at the end of 1980. The Israeli 
Central Bureau of Statistics has forecast for the year 
2,000 an Arab population of one million to 1.2 million in 
Israel; 1,000,000 to 1,18,000 in the VNlest Bank and 7,41,000 
to 10,70,000 in Gaza Strip all from natural increab-. 
The demographers say that by the year 2012 the Palestinians 
will achieve what called "population parity" with the Jews 
living in Palestine thus forcing a defacto binational 
state. Thus Israel sits on a demographic time bomb that 
threatens either the Jewish or the democratic character of 
the State, depending on how Israel deals with the 
Palestinians. The addition of more than a million Arab in 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank the many Israelis believe 
that the population of Israel would seriously jeoparadize 
30 the Jewish nature of the state. And growing number of 
28. Jews make up 62 per cent of the current population 
in Israel the West Bank and Gaza. By the 
year 2000 projections indicate there will be 
4.2 million Jews and 3.4 million Arabs in 
the same area. See J. Marcus, The Politics 
of Israel's security. International Affairs, 
Vol.65, No.2, Spring 1989, p.235. 
29. Jordan Times, 4-5 August 1988, p.4. 
30.. Strategic Survey 1986-87, the International Insti-
tute for Strategic Studies, Autumn 1987, 
London, p.117. 
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Palestinians will constitute a threat to Israel. After 
occupation of the West Bank of Jordan river, the 
Palestinian demogrphic problem became a matter of concern 
for Israelis. Now the Israeli leaders call for the 
forcible mass expulsion of the Arab population from Israel 
31 
and the occupied territories. 
David Ben Guri,on the first Prime Minister of Israel 
and his clleagues were concerned that the presence of 
large number of Arabs in the proposed Jewish State would 
not provide a stable basis for Jewish state. He 
pronounced, "I am for compulsory transfer, I do not see 
anything immoral in it .... there are two central issues, 
sovereignty and a reduction of the number of Arabs in the 
32 Jewish State, we must insist on both of them." 
The leader of Israel's small right-wing party Kach, 
Rabbi Meir Kahane, was more explicit when he said that: 
"I want to make life hard for Palestinians. I want them to 
think, it nake no sense to go on living here, let's make 
ll. By the year 2000 Gaza will have a population of 
about one million with an average age of 14 
longer life expectancy and a lower infant 
mortality rate - See F.J. Khergamvala 
Palestine Agony, Frontline, 6-19 February 
1988, p. 43. See also J. Reuvoney Aspects of 
Israeli Foreign Policy, in R. Barston, (ed.), 
The Other Powers : Studies in the Foreign 
Policies of Small States, George Allen and 
Unwin, London, 1973, p.165. 
;2. McDowall, n.6, p. 197. 
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them take over compensation payment and leave.... I could 
only use force on those who do not want to leave.... I 
would go all the way and they know that". Kahane believe 
that it was not only Arabs of the occupied territories who 
were the problem, we can get rid of those Arabs now The 
real problem was that there were many Arabs in Israel 
having Israeli citizenship. Once the Arab get a majority 
in this country, they would do what any self respecting 
nationalist would do. They would not accept living in a 
country called a Jewish State Once Arabs have gained a 
majority, they would be right, completely right and this 
33 
was only they should be moved out" 
In Spring 1986 the right wing Tehiya Party held a 
conference and its leader Yuval Neeman declared that 
"transfer of at least half a million refugees out of the 
land of Israel was precondition for peace negotiations. And 
at the end of the conference Tehiya called on the govern-
ment to help West Bank and Gaza residents to emigrate and 
34 to expel subversives. As early as 1980 a former chief of 
military intelligence, General Aharon Yariv remarked that, 
there was widely held opinion in favour of exploiting a 
future war to expel upto 8,00,000 Arabs. He warned that 
"such a plan already existed and that the means of imple-
33. Ibid., p. 257. 
34. Ibid., p. 257. 
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35 
mentation had been prepared. Thus, the majority of the 
Israeli Jewish population is pro-transfer Davish Haaretz 
Paper had a poll showing 617o of Jewish adult being 
protransfer. 8,00,000 Palestinian were uprooted to make 
way for 50,000 Jewish settlers after 1967. Israel seized 
one third of the land in the Gaza Strip to accommodate 
1,300 Jewish settlers, pushing the 610,000 Palestinian 
37 inhabitants into an over-crowded slum. The high growing 
rate of the Arab population in the occupied territories and 
Israel couple with the slower growth rate of Jews has 
driven Israel to seek ways to reduce the number of young 
and educated Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza by deportion, 
killing and destruction of their homes. Israel tried hard 
to make life uncomfortable for all the Palestinians in 
the West Bank and Gaza. As former Israel's Army General 
Rebavam Zeevi has stated ...."We Israelis can encourage the 
Palestinian to leave of their own free will by adopting 
what of call a negative magnet policy in the West Bank and 
-5,8 Gaza.... no work in Israel, no industries,no Universities": 
35. Ibid., p. 259. 
36. News Week., 12 November, 1990, p.56. 
37. P. Trikanned, Palestinian State in Born, The Daily, 
(Bombay), 2 December 1988, p.9. 
38. An Inrterview with former Israeli's Army General 
Rehavam Zeevi on 12 November 1990, Newsweek, 
p. 56. 
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Jordanian figures show that 22,000 Arab youth left 
the West Bank for Jordan and the Gulf in 1978. Educational 
opportunities are limited and employment of University 
39 graduates on the West Bank is severely ristricted. About 
12,000 Palestinians are being forced to leave their 
ancestral homes and move east either into Jordan or to join 
many wondering refugees in other countries.^ 140,000 
people from the West Bank and 83,000 from Gaza Strip have 
been forced to emigrate, most of them young men of working 
age in 1986.^^ 
Since 1948 Palestinian migration has been 
influenced by four main factors: first approximately 
800,000 Palestinians became homeless in Palestine and 
around the world after the creation of State of Israel in 
1948. Second, the policy carried out by the Israeli 
authorities against Palestinians in the occupied territories 
since 1967 led to the migration of 455,000 Palestinians. 
Third, During the oeriod 1950-53 the inability of local 
economic systems to absorb Palestinians in the occupied 
territories. Fourth, in the oil producing Arab countries 
and their lack of qualified manpower presented educated and 
39. Mroz, n. 21, p.65. 
40. Jimmy Carter, The Blood of Abraham, Houghton Moffim 
Company, Boston, 1985, p. r53. 
41. A. Al-Kazaz, The Middle East Economy Since 1980s, 
Aussen Politik, Vol. 39, No.3, 3rd quarter, 
1986, p. 255. 
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skilled Palestinians with the opportunities to improve 
42 their status and income. 
The Likud government embarked upon a settlement 
policy. The West Bank was oriented not primarily to 
security considerations but to long-term demographic ones. 
The Likud government announced that its aim is to implace 
100,000 Israelis on the West Bank by 1990 and 1.2 million 
by 2010. Israel wants to create a fait accompli which 
would change the demographic balance and geographical 
compositions of the territories. Without a major change in 
the demographic balance in favour of Israelis the control 
of the area can not be ensured. Israel has not annexed 
the West Bank and Gaza because demographically the West 
Bank and Gaza will remain proponderantly Arab for a long 
time. 
The future of occupied territories with more than 
1.5 million Palestinians representing the largest group of 
Palestinian people in Israel's chief policy issue. But 
Israel has three choices in essence: to establish its own 
42. Jamil M. Tahir, An Assessment of Palestinian Human 
Resources: Higher Education and Manpower, 
Journal of Palestine, Vol. 14, No.3, Spring 
1985, p.43. 
43. N . Kaplowitz, the Search for peace in the Middle 
East, International Security, Vol. 7, No.l, 
Summer 1982, p.207. 
-^ 14. Palscov, n. 13, pp. 59-60. 
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nation of security and withdraw unilaterally; to engage in 
systemic Arab depopulation of most if not all of western 
Palestine; to step up Jewish immigration from abroad. 
Jewish immigration has always been a factor in the demogra-
phic equation of Israel. Since the establishment of the 
State over 1.5 million Jews have arrived from abroad under 
the Israel's law of return, Israel received 580,000 Jews 
from Arab countries between 1948 and 1972.^^ Israel is an 
active country encouraging immigration which is ready to be 
the home of some or majority of the Jews of the world. The 
Zionist ideology is to gether the Jews once again into 
their old country. Human resources is regarded one of the 
important resources in the balance of power between Jews 
and Arab general and between Israeli (Jews) and Palestinian 
in particular. Ben Garion hold called on prevents in 1943 
to fulfill their demographic duty, stressing that "2 child-
ren per family was insufficient and that the Jewish 
population in Palestine was in a State of demographic 
decay".^^ 
45. Gerald Segal, The Simon and Schuster: Guide to the 
World Today, Simon and Schuster, London,1987, 
p~. 171. The corresponding rate of Jewish 
increase was between 1948 and 1972, 3.2 per 
cnet but half that increase resulted from 
immigration approximately 100,000 Soviet Jews 
who have immigrated since 1972. See D.J. 
Simpson, Israel after thirty years, Current 
History, Vol.76, No. 443, January 1979, p.17. 
46. McDowall, n. 6, p. 165 
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Professor Roberto Bacchi reported to the cabinet in 
1966 that the end of the country there would be 4.2 million 
Jews and 1.6 million Arab in Israel. As a result of his 
report, in 1967 a government demographic centre was 
established because an increase in population in Israel is 
crucial for the future of the Jewish people. Speaking on 
Israeli Radio, Prime Minister Peres appealed "to mothers to 
have at least four children and reiterate J. the essential 
imperative for Jews to remain a majority. 
In 1945 the world Jewish population stood at 11 
million and in 1970 it grew to a peak of 13 million but by 
1987 declined to 12.8 million as a result of a Diaspora 
birth rate of 1.2 per cent well below the replenishment 
level of 2.1 per cent. Diaspora Jewry currently numbering 
9.3 million will decline to an estimated 8 million or below 
by the end of the century .'^^ 
The Jews of Israel are similarly split between the 
Ashkenazi (European) and Sephardi (Middle Eastern and North 
African) communities. The Ashkenazi arrived first and 
made up the over-whelming majority when the state of Israel 
came to existence in 1948. They maintain close contact 
with Europe and America and the majority of them support 
47. Ibid., p.165. 
48. Ibid. , p. 166. 
49. Ibid., p. 169. 
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socialism and their culture in Western. As a result, 
Ashkenazi have given their support to the Labor Party which 
expenses socialism and which own every national election 
until 1977.^° 
The Sephardim did not immigrate large numbers until 
after the state was established and only recently have 
become the large group. Due to their lower levels of 
skills and education they have been at considerable 
disadvantages, being a predominantly blue collar group 
group they viewed themselves as oppressed and blamed the 
Ashkenazi for this discrimination . Today, Sephardim are 
50. Hohn J. Mc Tague Jr. Israel and South Africa: 
Acomparision of Policies, Journal of Palestine 
Studies, Vol. XIV, No.3, Spring 1985, p.105. 
51. Sephardim, while they share a common Jewish 
heritage with the Ashkenazim of European. 
Russian-American origin their different 
countries of origin mean that they ae 
culturally distinct, in religious terms. The 
Sephardim both observant and non-observant 
share a common respect for Jewish tradition. 
In addition, they tend to belong to the lower 
socio-economic levels of society while their 
Ashkenazi counterparts dominate the upper 
ones. Israel thus faces a pressing problem of 
relative deprevation concerned amongst the 
Sephardim. This socio-economic gap has created 
a serious ethnic divide between the two 
communities and this gap still remains wide a 
cycle of poverty has evolved from which it is 
difficult to break-out. As a consequence the 
Sephardim today comprise the majority of 
Israel's working class. See Elshazly, n.l5, 
pp. 60-62 and Yoke, n.65, pp. 175-176. 
130 
Israel's largest ethnic group comprise around 557= of 
Israel's population and 45% of its electorate. Israel has 
maintained to give top priority to attracting Jews for all 
over the world. And today the issue of immigration of 
Soviet Jews to Israel has added a new dimension to the 
Palestinian question. The influx of Soviet immigrants 
gives Israel's Jewish population a widening edge over the 
Arabs despite their higher birth rate 201 Soviet Jews 
emmigrated to Israel in 1986, and over 70,000 Jews left the 
5 2 Soviet Union in 1989. Israel's Housing Minister Ariel 
Sharon stated that "at the first stage one million Soviet 
Jewish immigrants were on their way to Israel and he hoped 
53 
there would be two millions or more by 1992. 
Soviet migration is a dream that has come true for 
Israel's Jews who had feared they would become a minority 
in Greater Israel, with the Palestinian population growing 
so much faster than their own. It is a right more to the 
Palestinians who see in the occupied territories the influx 
as a new threat to their long fight for a state. 
5 2. Deborah Lipson, A New Beginning, News From Israel, 
May 1990, p. 8 on May 24, 1991 about 15,000 
Ethiopian Jews arrived in Israel (Operation 
Soloman). See News From Israel, Vol. XXXVIII, 
No. 7, July 1991, pp. 15-18. At present there 
are more than 26,000 Ethiopian Jews Scattered 
across Israel. See Newsweek, 10 June 1991, 
p.27. 
53. Sawt Alshaab, (Amman) 18 October 1990, p.12, 
(Arabic) 
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Palestinians are asking why Israel deliberately tries to 
resettle hundreds of thousand of Soviet Jews in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip while Palestinains are denied the right 
to return to their home land. 
Moderates like Peres say that the presence of so 
many more Jews will give Israel the confidence to make 
sacrifices at the negotiating table. But hard-line view 
the influx as a stunning victory in the demographic war 
against the Palestinian and moderates for a Greater Israel. 
Israel's Prime Minister Shamir, enlisted this and wave of 
"aliya" (Literally going up to Israel) as a national for 
continuing Israeli control over territories captured in 
the June war. Israel needed the space (in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip; to house all the people. Increased 
immigration required Israel to be big as well. Israel must 
have the land of Israel and they would have to fight for 
it.' Shamir is just as confident that immigrants would 
grow fulfilling his concept of Greater Israel. he stated 
that "with all the waves of immigration that would come the 
State would be different would look different." Simcha 
Dinitz, Jewish Agency chairman declared that "We want to 
54. Geoffrey Aronson, Soviet Jewish Immigration, the 
United States and the occupied territories. 
Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XIX, No.4, 
Summer 19^0, p.30. 
55. Ibid., p. 37 
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put the emphasis on Jerusalem In absorbing the Soviet 
Jews." 12,000 Soviet Immigrants have settled In Jerusalem 
56 beyond the green land since the beginning of the 1990. 
Ariel Sharon disclosed plans to build 25,000 more 
homes for Jews in the occupied territories: Sharon's 
announcement heightened Palestinian fears that the immig-
rants will be settled at this expense. A $ 2 billion 
programme was announced to house and settle an expected 
100,000 arrivals with much of funds stated to be raised 
from world Jewry. 
The changes in nature of the Soviet regime, 
Gorbachev's policy of Glasnost and Perestorlka led to a 
massive wave of immigration. Russian Jewry were confronted 
with a fundamental choice, to remain in Russia and face 
c o 
economic hardship and anti-Semitism or to emigrate. 
56. Ibid., p. 39. 
57. Andrew Whitely, Israel, The Middle East Review,16th 
edition, the World ol Information, London, 
1990, p. 82, At present Israel wants to borrow 
$ 10 billion from the U.S. to settle Soviet 
Immigration. See Time, 30 September 
1991, p.29. 
58. News From Israel, Vol. XXXVIII, No.2, February 1991 
p"^  T5~. As a result of the liberalization of 
Soviet policies and the imposition of stricter 
limits on the number of Soviet Jews accepted 
by the U.S. the number of Soviet tens of 
thousands of Soviet Jewish immigrants Inflow 
into Israel. For the impact of Glasnost, 
Perestoreika and antisemitism on the Soviet 
Jews immigration. see Zvi Glteman Glasnost, 
Perestoralka and antisemitism. Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 70, No.2, Spring 1991, pp.141-159. 
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Three factors had prompted the Kremlin to pursue a liberal 
policy on the sizable influx of Soviet Jews into Israel. 
Then Russia wished to develop meaning ful ties with Israel. 
After a break of 24 years, on October 1991 Soviet Union had 
agreed to restore full diplomatic relation with Israel. 
This was essential, if the Soviet Union was to exercise a 
greater influence on the Middle East stage. The open 
policy on Jewish immigration is a Sinequa non for it to 
59 
enjoy trade and credit concession from the U.S. 
Within two or three years it is anticipated that 
there should be one million new Russian immigrants in 
Israel. Over one million Soviet Jews had filed application 
for exist visas between January 1989 and June 1990. Many 
of whome are highly skilled and these are mostly city 
dwellers. Being the scapegoats for the blatant anti-
serritic attacks, they are afraid of the deteriorating 
economic conditions. 
Nearly 407o of the Soviet immigrants are trained in 
engineering, medicine and service skills that could 
resuscitate the nation stagnant economy. European Jews 
59. The Independent, of January 1991, p.9. See also 
Ahmed A~. Kharaesat, Jews in the Soviet Union 
and Immigration Movement, Al Aqsa, No.816, 
July 1990, (Jordanian Armed Forces HQ. Amman), 
pp. 76-79, (Arabic). 
60. Why the furore about Soviet Jewish Emigration to 
Israel, Newbrief, Royal United Services for 
Defense Studies, Vol. 10, No.7, July 1990, 
pp. 49-51. 
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will again out number oriental Jews, reinforcing the 
nation's western identity for the first time since the 
1960s. Because most Soviet Jews are non-observant, they 
will considerably weaken the influence of the ultra 
orthodox parties, which enjoy a disproportionate share of 
6l political power. 
The new influx of Soviet Jews to Israel can not by 
itself reserve the demographic trend towards the 
Palestinian numerical pre-dominance. In the long run it 
may not be in favour of Israel as not all the new 
immigrants consider Israel their permanent homes. However, 
in the meantime, the new immigration, promises to 
consolidate and strengthen the Jewish population and delay 
the day when the Palestinians will out number the Jews in 
the entire area now under Israel control. Prior to the new 
influx of Soviet Jews the Israeli Jews had stood to loose 
progressively, their pre-ponderance over the total number 
of Palestinians in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza 
through disparities in Jewish and Arab birth rates (2.7 
births per women among the Jews and 4.2 among Palestinians). 
This prospect had represented both a mounting security 
problem for Israel as well as a threat to the democratic 
and Jewish character of the state. Hence Israel was facing 
61- Time, 14 January 1991, pp. 15-16. 
62. Rosemary, Hollis, Israel on the Brink of Decision, 
Division, Unicy and Cross currents in the 
Israeli body politic, Conflict Studies, 231, 
May 1990, p.3. (Research Institute For the 
Study of Conflict and Terrorism London), 
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fertility driven security pressure. Israel has succeeded in 
preserving and enhancing its society through vastly out 
numbered by its Arab neighbour states since its existence 
over four decades. The fertility level of Israel's Jews 
has been lower than Israel's Arab. Despite the stepping up 
of Jewish immigration from abroad, fertility rate for 
Palestinian in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are still 
higher. He feared that within few decades Jews might 
become a minority population in Greater Israel. 
The refugee communities represent in more than one 
way the most serious security problem for Israel. The 
refugees in the West Bank amount to 373,586 (registered by 
UNRWA on 30 June 1987) dispersing in 20 camps between Jemin 
in the north and Heborn in the south. In Gaza Strip, 
refugees number 445,000 (registered by UNRWA on 30 June 
1987) approximately 2/3 of the population there, living in 
eight camps ranging from Jibalya in the north and Rafiah in 
the south. There are the most over-crowded parts of the 
64 territories and therefore, the hardest part to control.' 
Forty-four per cent of the West Bank population and seventy 
per cent of the Gaza Strip population are refugees. Indige-
neus and Palestinian refugees have forty years experience 
of living together in adverse conditions. 
6 3. Nicholas Eberstadt Population Change and National 
Security, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No.3, 
Summer 1991, p. 126. 
64. Yorke, n. 28, p.32. 
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The Palestinian Up-rlslng and Israel's Response 
In about 25 years of occupation, the Palestinian of 
the occupied territories have been mounting the most 
effective challenge to Israeli rule since December 1987. 
During the last week of the 1987 the spread of the 
Palestinian popular uprising called Intifada (Arabic from 
the shake or to shake off) was due to the maturation of 
long-term social and economic process within Palestinian 
society under the impact of Israeli military administration. 
In occupied territories thousands of Arabs who normally 
worked on Israeli projects refused to do so. The uprising 
of Palestinian had an enduring political, social and 
economic impact not only on Arab-Jewish relation with-'n the 
6 5 territories but also throughout the Israeli society. 
The Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza 
has created a phase of political depression and widened 
more than ever the deep chasm between the Israelis who want 
to retain the territories and those willing to give them. 
Intifada has created a political within the country. 
Intifada has forced the Israeli society to reconsider its 
relationship with the Palestinians more seriously and 
created a growing minority within Israel who are prepared 
to seek up for Palestinian rights. For the first time. 
65. Don, Peretz, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising, 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 66, No.5, Summer 1989, 
p. 964. 
66. Ibid., p. 965, 
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intifada has led to polarization within Israel's society 
with regard to the Palestinian question. Its aim is to 
exhaust Israel by forcing it to sustain the deployment of 
large forces to deal with the uprising together with heavy 
economic damage, and intensify the internal debate and 
strengthen and encourage those parties that favour an 
Israeli withdrawl from the territories. Intifada seeks to 
draw international attention to the plight of inhabitant 
there and refocus world attention on the core problem of 
the Middle East. In short, the Indifada has the central 
aim of asking the world community to find an immediate 
solution to the Palestinian problem. 
The impact of the intifada has been more profound. 
The tough, often brutal measure used to supprises the 
uprising have damaged not only Israel's image abroad but 
the self-image of the Israeli themselves. Israel has 
recognized that unless it is able to suppress the intifada, 
its strategic situation would be changed fundamentally. 
Thus, the most dangerous aspect of the uprising is the 
damage from the perspective of the Israeli government, and 
it may cause to Israel's image abroad especially because of 
the death of several hundred Palestinian during the 
67. Z. Eytan, (ed.), The Middle East Military Balance 
1988-1989, The Jerusalem Post, West View Press, 
Jerusalem, 1989, p.6. 
68. Bob Jobbins, Compromise or Conflict: Prospects in 
the Middle East, Brassey's Defence Year Book 
1990, Royal United Services Institute, London, 
^7329. 
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uprising. The Minister of Defence Yitzhak Rabin has 
sharply ordered the Israeli troops to sten up reprisals 
69 
against the Palestinian organized struggle. As a result, 
the number of casualities among young Palestinians has 
sharply increased. 800 Palestinians were killed and 
thousands injured in March 1990. About a quarter of the 
dead Palestinians had been killed by their own compatriots 
for collaboration with Israelis. By the end of the 
October 1989, over 40,000 Palestinian had been arrested and 
nine thousand of these were being held under "adminis-
trative detention" (for upto one year without trial) in 
the beginning of 1990. Some of the leading Palestinian 
figure's had been expelled from the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip by Israel. The Intifada and Israel's response have 
become long drawn-out struggle for control of the political 
and economic infrastructures of life in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. 
69. Milutin Milenkovic, The Thorny Path to an Inter-
national Peace Conference, Review of Inter-
national Affairs, 933, Vol. XI, 1^ February 
1989, P~. rS (Jugoslovnska Stvarnost, Belgrade) 
70. A new count by Israeli military authorities puts 
321 the number of Palestinian killed by other 
Arabs on suspicion of collaborating with 
Israel since the start of the intifada 
uprising. 330 of them were killed while in 
detention. The count said another 991 
Palestinians were injured in such attack. See 
The Independent, 2 November 1990, p.4. 
71. Mollis, n. 63, p.12. 
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Israel is using live ammunition, rubber bullets, 
various forms of tear gas, beatings, mass arrests, 
occasional deportation, destruction of homes, dismissal of 
democratically elected mayors, expulsion of scholar and 
teachers, closing down of Journals and Universities, 
censorship, curfews, dispersion of student demonstrations 
with weapons and prohibition of cultural aspiration of the 
Palestinians, sieges of unruly villagers and various degree 
of economic punishment against Palestinian rioters. Arabs 
can be detained for up to one year without trial. Their 
houses can be sealed or demolished on suspicion that a 
number of the family is engaged in anti-Israeli activities. 
Israeli soldiers and border police can enter Arab homes 
without a warrant, crackdown on the Palestinian Press, 
censor all news papers, magazines and book in the 
territories and put restrictions on civil liberties. 
Israel wants armed retaliation by the Palestinians 
to justify a course of mass eviction of Palestinians from 
their homeland. Yitzhak Rabin the Defence minister of 
Israel has admitted that "deportion was part of their 
73 system. According to some Israeli officials this is the 
last of the Palestinian uprising and such a phenomenon will 
never be repeated. 
72. Jan-Mitzger and other. This Land is our Land: The 
West Bank Under Israeli Occupation, Zed Press, 
London, 1983, pp. 5"^  65-75. See also Time, 
25 January 1988, p.16 
73. Time, 11 January 1988, p.25. 
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The Palestinian uprising in the Israeli-occupied 
territories has already established itself as a fact of 
life in the Middle East. Though the intifada entered its 
sixth year is in December 1992, it has not yielded any 
tangible gains for the cause. However, one may conclude 
that the uprising has produced created some advantage and 
achievements in favour of the Palestinians: 
1. Israeli leaders regarded the Palestinian uprising 
as a matter of current internal security. They believe in 
crushing the uprising. But the Intifada has a costly 
impact on Israel's military capabilities, creating a major 
new internal security threat to the occupying Israeli 
forces. The need to devote a large amount of Israel's 
military man power to internal security functions against 
the Palestinians has become institutionalized into a long-
term arrangement. Without cutting back on some of regular 
military forces, Israel can not afford to fund necessary 
internal security activities. Therefore, the intifada has 
disrupted Israel's mobilization and training activity. 
2. The intifada has its effect on the IDF operations 
in the occupied territories. The army asked for over $ 200 
million as additional fund for 1988/89 and about half that 
sum for 1989/90 to compensate for additional expenditures 
incurred as a result of the uprising. It received an 
additional budget of $90 million for 1988/89 and about $ 50 
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million for 1989/90. Another direct economic consequence 
of the uprising is the decline in tourism, which decreased 
by 15 per cent in 1988 (down from ever 1.5 million in 1987 
to 1.3 million in 1988) causing direct loss to the Israeli 
economy of a quarter of a billion dollars. 
Israel's trade surplus in goods and services with 
the occupied territories dropped by two-thirds from $174 
million in 1987 to only $56 million in 1988, a loss of $120 
million. Israel's Minister of Economy, God Yaacobly 
estimated in 1988, that the economic cost of the intifada 
at between $600-700 million, roughly equivalent to 2 per 
cent of Israel's Gross Domestic Product. However, the 
economic factor remained of secondry importance to Israel. 
3. In July 31, 1988 the most Important out come of the 
intifada has been king Hussein's decision to relinquish 
Jordanian sovereignty over the West Bank in favour of the 
P.L.O., thereby killing the so-called "Jordanian option" 
and forcing the world to deal directly with the Palesti-
nians. For Jordan, the intifada has posed a conflicting 
challenge. The emotional pull of the intifada might engulf 
Jordan's own Palestinians estimated at between 40-50% of 
74 the population. 
7 4. On May 20, 1990 a 21-year-old Israeli Jew put on 
his brother's uniform took' his M-16 assault 
rifle and raked a group of Palestinian workers, 
killing seven of them at an intersection in 
Rishion Le Ziem. As a response a young Palesti-
nian wounded eight french teurists in Amman. 
See Atran, n.38, p.51. See also Robert Satloff, 
Jordan Looks inward Current History, Vol.89,' 
No.544, February 1990, p. 58. 
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A. During the period under review the intifada is 
largely, if not solely, responsible for the change in 
P.L.O's position. This has led to the proclamation of an 
independent Palestinian State by the P.L.O. in West Bank 
and Gaza Strip, and to the P.L.O's decision to renounce 
terrorism and accept Israel's right to exist which is 
turned paved the way for the diplomatic dialogue between 
the U.S. and the P.L.O. 
5. It has given rise to Islamic fundamentalist move-
ment within the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a political 
power. The "United leadership" - a local leadership in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, whose weight in the Palestinian 
National Movement has been considerable, directs the 
uprising inside the territories. The Gaza based Jihad Al-
Islamic and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) 
frequently differ with the P.L.O. over both tactics and 
subjects. 
6. The Intifada has strengthened and enhanced the 
States of the P.L.O. as a political power in the inter-
national arena and not as a terrorist organisation. After 
the proclamation of an independent Palestinian State in 
the occupied territories, over 100 countries have conferred 
recognition on that yet-to-be formed. The intifada has 
given the Palestinians a sense of pride is being 
Palestinians, It has united Palestinia-ns geographically, 
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so that those in the occupied territories relate to those 
in Israel and vice-versa. 
7. The Palestinian uprising has drawn international 
attention to the Palestine problem and made it clear that 
Palestinians are important partners in any settlement in 
the Middle East. 
What happens next does not depend crucially on how 
long the intifada lasts but it depends on Israel's and 
Palestinians reaction. Till now the Israelis have been 
confident about keeping the territories under their control 
and gradually incorporating them into their set up without 
having to v\70rry to much about local opposition. With the 
change in Israeli administration after the coming into 
power by labour party, the high hopes grew about the 
resolution of the conflict. But it is yet to be seen what 
would be the outcome of the present on going peace 
process, which was initiated with high blooms after the 
Gulf War. So, the instability will continue with the 
continuation of the Palestinians conflict. 
75. Eytan, Gilboa, The Palestinian Uprising: has it 
turned American Public Opinion, ORBIS, Vol.33, 
No.l, Winter 1989, pp. 21-37. 
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CHAPTER V 
ISRAEL - U.S. RELATIONS 
In the U.S. strategic calculations Palestine prior 
to the World War II, was considered as an area of British 
interests and domination. U.S. strategic interests in the 
region began to grow in the wake of World War II. Since 
then it maintains very, very strategic relations with Israel 
as almost from the birth of Israel, the successive U.S. 
administrations have provided all kind of assistance, 
political, economic and military to Israel. However, even 
before the emergence of Israel, United States supported the 
Balfour Declaration which envisioned the State of Israel to 
be established in Palestine. 
Moreover, U.S. recognition of the State of Israel 
on 15 May 1948 acquired a great symbolic importance since 
then. U.S. has been supporting Israel on almost all issues 
of crucial interest to the Jewish State. During 1960's, 
B. Reich, U.S. Interest in the Middle East, in H, 
Shaked and I. Rabinovich, (ed.), The Middle 
East and the U.S.: Perceptions and Politics, 
Transaction Book, London, 1980, p~. 72~. 
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America sought to maintain regional stability through a 
balance of power in the area and treated Israel as a 
military proxy. Under the Kennedy and Johnson administra-
tions the U.S. became a significant arms supplier to the 
State of Israel. In 1962 President Kennedy assured 
Israel's foreign minister Mrs Meir that "America and Israel 
were defacto allies".^ The U.S.- Israeli relations, 
however, cooled down during the Eisenhower-Dulles period 
but that was to remain only temporary departure. After the 
1967 Arab-Israeli war, President Nixon's doctrine aimed at 
building up friendly regional states through aid resulted 
into increased American commitment to Israel. 
President Nixon had stated that "Israel must 
possess sufficient military power to deter an attack. As 
long as the threat of the Arab attack remained direct and 
imminent, the military balance must be in Israel's favour. 
He supported a policy that gave Israel a technological and 
military margin to more than necessary to offset Israel's 
3 
hostile neighbours numerical superiority. 
President Nixon affirmed in 1970 "we are for 
Israel because in our view is the only State in the Mideast 
2. David Astor and Valerie Yorke, Peace in the Middle 
East: Super Powers and Security Guarantees, 
A unique report corgi, A Division oT Trans 
world Publishers Ltd., London, 1978, p.46. 
3. R.C. Gupta, America Arms in West Asia, Puneet 
Publishers, Delhi, 1985, pp. 141-142. 
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which is pro-freedom and an effective opponent to Soviet 
expansion". President Jimmy Carter was the first American 
President to say publicly that Israel was a strategic asset 
to U.S. On 16 March 1977 he observed: "I think one of the 
finest acts of the world nations that's ever occured was to 
establish the State of Israel." 
President Reagan made similar statements: "as 
perhaps the only remaining strategic asset in the region on 
which U.S. can truly rely....only by full appreciation of 
the critical role, the state of Israel plays in our 
strategic calculus. Can we build the foundation for 
thwarting Moscow's designs on territories and resources 
vital to our security and our national well being". 
Reagan's administration regarded Israel as a cornerstone in 
the Middle East and provided ironclad commitment to what 
Israel considers its security requirements. In November 
1983 Israeli Prime Minister shamir and Defence Minister 
Arens visited U.S. where they signed on agreement with the 
U.S. on strategic cooperation. A similar agreement was 
by the previous U.S. administration in 1981 which was 
A. David McDowall, Palestine and Israel: The Uprising 
and Beyond" I.B. Tauris and Co., London" 
1989, p.46. 
5. Department of State, Bulletin, Vol. LXXVI, No. 
1972, 11 April 1977, Washington D.C., p.334. 
6. McDowall, No.4, p. 46. 
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freezed by the President Jimmy Carter following Israel's 
annexation of the Golan Heights. The accord provided for 
the creation of a joint committee exercise, the sharing of 
intelligence, and the stockpiling of American arms and, 
ammunition on Israeli territory. From this strategic 
cooperation the U.S. forces gained many advantages 
including access for the U.S. navalship to Haifa and 
valuable exchangeson advanced technology. 
Syrian defence Minister feared that the alliance 
between the U.S. and Israel would enable the Zionist 
regime's military capability to expand maximally. He feared 
that the strengthening of Israel's role in the region could 
create an excuse for interaction by the U.S. as the latter 
has become not only. Israel's friend but its strategic 
ally. 
In May 1986, Israel joined the U.S. Strategic 
Defence initiative programme with its potential for apply-
ing ATB19 technology to countering the SS19 challenge to 
Israel. The U.S. Congress approved $ 180 million for 
Israel to develop a defensive system against short range 
M. Sid-Ahmed, Reagan Foreign Policy in the Middle 
East, in H. Hochler, (ed.). The Reaean 
Administrations Foreign Policy: F"ac"ts and 
Judgement of the internal Tribunal, Third 
World Centre, New York, 1984, p.221. 
A. Levran, The Military Balance in the Middle 
East" in A. Leveran, (ed.), The Middle East 
Military Balance, 1986, Jerusalem Post, 
Jerusalem, 1987, p. 149. 
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missiles, thus making for the country's entry into the Star 
9 
wars programme. 
As a partition in a strategic alliance, Israel 
provides several advantages to the U.S." Israel's geogra-
phic location along with its military facilities offers the 
U.S. good bases should intervention in the Arabian 
Peninsula be necessary. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt gas appraised 
"the military value of Israel to the U.S. is derived not 
only from its location, adjacent to the oil-rich Persian 
region and at junction of three continentals but also from 
the sophistication and prodigious efficiency of its defence 
forces"."""*^  A single U.S. division of 25,000 and its 
equipment of 70,000 tons would take four weeks to reach the 
theater using all U.S. air lift resources. If these 70,000 
tons were already in position in Israel the time advantages 
could be crucial. The U.S. Airforce would need three 
million gallons of fuel a day just for the tactical air 
craft of the RDF (Rapid Development Force). The bulk of 
this requirement must be prepositioned in the origin to 
9. Israel became the Third Foreign Country to joint 
the U.S. in conducting research on the RDI 
Israel's role has been in the field of anti-
tactical ballistic missile system. See F.J. 
Khergumvala, Palestine Agony, Frontline, 
6-19 February 1988, p. 46 . 
10. Saked and Rabinovich, The Middle East and the 
U.S. Perceptions and Politics, Transaction 
Book, London, 1980, p. TTi 
11. J. Laffin, A European Strategy for the Middle East, 
RUSI Journal, Vol. 129, No.3, September 1984, 
p.26. Sei Tlso Roert C. Kingston, From RDF 
to CENCOM; New Challenge, Armed Forces, 
Vol.3, No.3, May 1984, pp. 170-r77: 
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supply these aircraft for about 30 days of combat. Israel's 
formidable air defences make fuel dumps more secure than 
most other potential sites, they are also much less liable 
to sabotage in Israel than in other Middle Eastern 
Countries. 
The U.S. airforce intelligence Chief Major General 
George J. Keegan noted may back in 1979 that: "Israel" 
contribution to the U.S. is north U.S. $1000 for every 
dollar worth of aid we have granted here....the military 
13 information we get from Israel is worth billions." Former 
Israeli Prime Minister Begin claimed that Israel 
contributed more to U.S. security than any thing else. He 
said, "Israel gives to the U.S. Strategic aid and 
contributes to its national security more than the U.S. 
aids to Israel and contributes to its security. We know 
what is inside a Soviet T-72 tank, we shoot down a Mig-25 
and put the pieces together. The U.S. do not know what is 
inside the tank and have never shoot down a Mig-25. We 
have invented a system to destroy ground to air missile 
batteries without losing even one plan. The American do not 
have such a system and neither does NATO. I am sure one 
day we will share these three secrets with the Americans 
12. Ibid., p. 26. 
13. K. Varma, A, friend in New America is Israel's Pal 
Indeed, Gentleman, June 1985, p.27. 
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14 
and this will be great contribution to America." 
During the Arab-Israeli war Israeli army captured 
huge cashes of Rusian arms and passed them into the U.S. 
for analysis. This enabled the U.S. To know the State of 
technology of its chief rival. Israel is often first to 
use new U.S. jets and weapon system in combat supplying the 
America with vital data about their performance and 
developing low cost improvements, Israel thus tests U.S. 
weapons in the field and since war-tested weapons have more 
demand in the international market this increase the sale 
of U.S. arms. 
Financial Support 
Ariel Sharon was reported to have said in 1984 
that, "Israel had served several American interest since 
1948 and this service was worth $100 billion, since all 
Israel had received as of 1984 was $30 billion, Israel did 
not owe the U.S. anything, infact the U.S. owed Israel $70 
billion." Yitzhak Zeigar expressed Israel's true value 
this way: "who will count the tens or perhaps hundreds of 
billion of dollars that the U.S. would have to pay to 
14. P. Dasgupta, Cheated by the World: The Palestine 
Experience, Orient Longman, Bombay, 1988, 
p. 260. 
15. Yair evron. The Middle East, Nations Super-Powers 
and Wars, Elek, London, 1973, p.148. 
16. Benganin B., Hallami, The Israeli Connection: Who 
Israel Arms and Why, Pantheon Books, New 
York, 1*)87, p. 197. 
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create another Israel in the Persian Gulf, in Central 
America, in Southeast Asia and in other places." 
The financial aid of U.S. has been essential for 
Israel's survival and development. By 1986 Israel had 
received more than $30 billion in grants and loans from the 
U.S. since 1948.-^ ^ 
The flow of aid increased dramatically in the 
following years. After the 1967 war U.S. grants and loans 
to Israel rose' to an average of around $300 million per 
year compared with the $100 million anually in the 
preceding year. After the 1973 October war U.S. assistance 
rockered to more than $2.5 billion in 1974 or 19.81 of the 
19 total U.S. assistance distributed world wide. By 1981 
following the Egypt-Israel treaty the U.S. assistance to 
Israel had increased to $2.3 billion or 20 per cent of U.S. 
20 
assistance world wide. (See Table 1). 
The U.S. interest in Israel was at various levels. 
Ideologically, Israel is often held up as a mirror image 
17. Ibid., p. 197. 
18. Yuri Andreyev, Zionism Preaching and Practice, 
Novisti Press Agency Publishing Hosue, 
Moscow, 1988, p.49. 
19. Valerie York, Domestic Politicss and Regional 
Security: Jordan, Syriya and Israel. The end 
of an era, IISS, Gower, Aldershot, Book-
field, Sydney and other, 1988, p. 206. 
20. Ibid., p. 207 
TABLE - I 
U.S . M i l i t a r y and Economic Aid t o I s r a e l 
1977-78 $ M i l l i o n 
Year 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
198A 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Economic A .id 
Loans Grants Total 
245 
260 
260 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
490 
525 
525 
525 
764 
806 
785 
910 
1,200 
1,200 
1,200 
1,200 
735 
785 
785 
525 
764 
806 
785 
910 
1,200 
1,200 
1,200 
1,200 
M i l i t a r y Aid 
Loans Grants Total 
500 
500 
2,700 
500 
900 
850 
950 
850 
-
-
-
-
500 
500 
600 
500 
500 
550 
750 
850 
1,400 
1,800 
1,800 
1,800 
1,000 
1,000 
3,300 
1,000 
1,400 
1,400 
1,700 
1,700 
1,400 
1,800 
1,800 
1,800 
T o t a l Economic and 
M i l i t a r y Aid 
Loans 
745 
760 
2,960 
760 
900 
850 
950 
850 
-
-
• 
-
Grants 
990 
1,025 
1,125 
1,025 
1,264 
1,356 
1,535 
1,760 
2,600 
3,000 
3,000 
3,000 
Total 
1,735 
1,785 
4,085 
1,785 
2,164 
2,206 
2,485 
2,610 
2,600 
3,000 
3,000 
3,000 
Total 765 10,130 10,895 7,750 11,550 19,300 8,775 21,680 30,455 
S o u r c e : Aaron S. Kl i eman , I s r a e l and t h e World A f t e r 40 
Y e a r s , P e r g m a n - B r a s s e y ' s I n t e r n a t i o n a l Defence 
P u b l i s h e r , New York 1990 , p . 204 . 
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by U.S. to whom the Jewish State is a reminder of their own 
early pioneering experiences of overcoming adversity. Many 
Americans because of the Holocaust express their support 
for Israel as a moral commitment. Others may relate it to 
religious considerations as a spiritual centre and holy 
land or to democratic considerations as a progressive 
society pledged to safe guarding individual freedoms. Still 
others identify Israelis as a people determined to defend 
their homeland and independence. Thus, Israel shared the 
values of U.S. society and had similar democratic framework 
of government and was developing other political 
21 institutions on western lines. 
The Jewish Lobby 
The U.S. sympathy is partly the result of the 
strong Zionist Lobby and the important position that the 
Jewish Community (Jewish population is, 5,700,000 in the 
U.S.) enjoyes in U.S. economy. U.S. Jews have affected 
U.S. - Israeli relation not only by serving as a bridge 
between the two countries but also through their impact of 
22 American politics and policy. In formulation of U.S. 
21. Arnold Hollinger, The Great Powers and the 
Middle East, in William E. Griffith,(ed.), 
The World and the Great Power Tringles, 
The Mit Press, Cambridge, London, 1975, 
p. 161 
22. Nadar Safran, Israel: The Embatted Alley, The 
Belknap Press of Havard University Press, 
Cambridge, London, 1978, p. 575. 
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policy towards Israel, the U S. Jewish Lobby has long been 
regarded as a key actor and Middle East Conflict in 
23 general. 
In 1906 the U.S. Jewish Committee the est-
ablished a high professional membership organization which 
regarded itself as the think-lank of the community. The 
Committee is responsible for publishing the mainstream 
dovish Journal "Present Tense" as well as "Commentary" 
which pursues its own independent neo-conservative line in 
tune with Israel. 
The impact of U.S. Jews had been to make Israel 
one of the most Americanized and America conscious 
countries in the world. U.S. Jews perceived that if Israel 
were to be destroyed they themselves would become highly 
vulnerable. Therefore, the establishment of the State of 
Israel has been crucial for U.S. Jews and they have been 
concerned about the future of Israel. Only 12% of U.S. 
Jews agreed with the Statement that "Israel's future is 
secure, the security of Israel was rated a very important 
issue by the highest ratio of 691 to l97o".^ ^ 
23. Jonathan Marcus, Discordant Voices' The U.S. -
Jewish Community and Israel during the 
1980's, International Affairs, Vol. 66, 
No. 3, July 1990, p. 54:3. 
24. Ibid., p. 548. 
25. Etyan, Gilbon, American Public Opinion Toward 
Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 
Lexington Books, D.E Heath and Company, 
Toronto, 1987, p. 264. 
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The Jewish Lobby in U.S. concerns for Israel's 
survival and reaction to Israel's problem's can be found in 
a number of actions by U.S. Jewry that are intended to 
strengthen Israel. These include financial aid, Lobbying 
on behalf of Israel. Expressions of favourable attitudes 
toward Israel might be construed as actions contributing 
to the cause. The preservation of Israeli Security has 
been one of the objectives of successive U.S. administra-
tion. For the purpose the United States provided all kind 
financial assistance to Israel. 
Military Support 
During the 1948 war, all of Israel's pilots were 
foreigners (Particularly Americans). The U.S. forces 
fighting for Israel violated the U.S. Nationality Act of 
1940, which forbade U.S. citizens from serving in the armed 
forces of a foreign State "unless expressly authorized by 
the Laws of the U.S."^^ 
In the 1967 war the U.S. provided more direct 
help to Israel. It is now clear that on 3 June 1967 4F-46 
aircraft, then U.S.'s most advanced combat reconnaissance 
plans were flownsecretly to Israel together with their U.S. 
pilots. On 12 June 1967 the aircraft flew several photo-
26. Ibid., p. 265. 
27. Stephen Green, Taking Sides: America's Secret 
Relations with a Militant Israel, William 
Morrow and Company, New York, r984, p.17. 
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reconnaissance missions over the Egyptian, Syrian and 
Jordanian fronts before they returned to their America 
bases in Europe. The U.S. pilots were instructed on 
arrival at the Spanish base to proceed to the Negeb desert 
and to provide tactical support for the IDF by Filming 
certain objectives. For the war which Israel planned to 
launch on 5 June against the Arabs. Disguised themselves 
as civilian employees of Israel and their planes painted 
with Israeli markings and the star of David, the U.S. 
28 pilots filmed the movements of Arab armies at night. The 
U.S. resupplied Israel with a substantial amount of 
military equipments during the 1973, October War (thirty 
U.S. C-130 transport planes were on their way to Tel Aviv 
including conventional munitions of many types, air-to-air 
anc air-to-ground missiles, artillery, crew-serve and 
individual weapons and a standard range of fighter air-
craft) President Nixon,had asked Congress to authorize $2.2 
billion as emergency security assistance for Israel. 
During the war at least 600 American tanks valued at some 
29 $ 250 million came into Israel. U.S. pilots were flying 
with the Israel air forces. A large number of these pilots 
had dual nationality that is carrying both Israeli and U.S. 
28. Ibid., pp. 206-211. 
29. B. Reich, Israel between War and Peace, Current 
History, Vol. 66, No. 390, February 1974, 
p. 51. 
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proposals."^^ The U.S. sent its high-flying strategic 
reconnaissance aircraft the SR-71 in the October 1973 war 
over the Egyptian front. It is known that "the information 
gathered by the SR-71 was passed to Israel and materially 
helped the Israeli high command to plan its counter attack, 
over the Suez Canal to penetrate Egyptian positions around 
n • 31 Devrsoir. 
The Israel airforce destroyed in June 1982, 18 
Syrian battations of Soviet-made anti aircraft missiles in 
Lebanon, a victory which opened the door to Israel's on 
slaught on Lebanon. This was made possible only because 
U.S. experts had passed to Israel the results of their 
32 long study of those missiles. 
These facts show that Israel could not exist 
without external aid especially the considerable volum it 
receives from the U.S. Thus the fate of Israel is linked 
to the national security interests of the U.S. and the U.S. 
has repeatedly made clear its commitment to the security of 
Israel. The U.S. is always determined to help Israel to 
have an edge on Its neighbours. 
30. Edger O'ballance, No Victor No Vanquished: The 
Yom Kippur VJar, Natural Publishers, New 
Dirhi7T980, p. 33. 
31. Saad, Elshazly, The Arab Military Option, American 
Mideast, San Trancisco, 1986, p.84. 
32. Ibid., p. 115. 
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Political Support 
On 18 March 1984, President Reagan while 
addressing Jewish Organisations in America noted that the 
U.S. and Israel vote the same way in the U.N. nine times 
out of ten; whereas the Western European member of NATO 
vote with the U.S. only six times in ten. President Reagin 
during the same speech reiterated that if Israel were ever 
33 
expelled from the U.N. the U.S. would withdraw too. The 
U.S. and Israel maintain very close Institutional and 
Commercial links which include: the joint political 
military group, which is concerned with strategic 
cooperation and the Joint Secretary Assistance planning 
group, which is concerned with military and economic 
cooperation. The U.S. and Israel signed a duty-free trade 
agreement in April 1985, the first of its kind the U.S. 
had ever signed with any foreign country. It lays down 
that all duties, excise tariff and other barriers were be 
lifted until by 1995. During the last decade in the lieu 
of a formal treaty the relationship has been regulated by a 
combination of implicit understandings, instituionalized 
consultation, and formal memorandums of agreement (MOAs) 
that include recognition by the U.S. of Israel as a major 
"non-NATO ally" and bilateral free-trade agreements. 
33 . Eshaly, n. 31, p. 86. 
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Militarily, economically and diplomatically Israel 
depends on the U.S. and is secure as long it continues to 
receive up $3 billion U.S. aid every year. It is unlikely, 
the U.S. would alter its stance and down grade Israeli 
security as a major American policy in the Middle East. 
One can say that from a conceptual, historical, political 
and psychological point of view, the relationship between 
Israel and U.S. is sound, founded on reciprocity and common 
interest. Given the U.S. interests in West Asia, U.S. 
support to Israel, economic, political and military will 
continue. 
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CONCLUSION 
Security will be high on the agenda of Middle East 
Countries throughout the 1990s. 
Security is the central problem of Israel's 
existence, it has high status in Israel's society and the 
large amount of resources are allocated to it. Israeli 
security dilemma, as stated in an earlier chapter is that 
it can envisage peace in Middle East only from a position 
of strength but once having achieved the position there 
seems to be futility in negotiation as it is secure in any 
case. 
The position of Palestine and the establishment of 
Israel in 1948 led to the first Arab-Israel confrontation. 
This confrontation was to lay the foundation of a future 
pattern of inter-state relations in this region. The issue 
of survival as linked to security for Israel and the 
question of usurping of territory by earstwhile colonial 
powers and the resultant displacement of the local popu-
lace. Subsequent history saw the ranging of international 
forces on both sides. There were wars again in 1967, 1973 
and in Lebanon in 1982. All these wars further entrenched 
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Israeli power in the region and also allowed it to expand 
in the name of security. The territorial expansion was 
made hand in hand with creation of new Jewish settlements. 
Israel has identified some specific the threat 
from Palestinian Fedyeen; the emergent chemical weapons 
programme in the Arab World, notably Iraq and Libya and the 
growing Islamic fundamentalism in the region. Israel tried 
to tackle the border problem by expanding its frontiers and 
creating new Jewish settlements along the border. In 
addition, it has retained control of most the strategic 
points along the border. In controlling the West Bank, 
Israeli leaders believe that, the land itself creates 
strategic depth, and Israeli settlements can provide a kind 
of early warning. Returning the bulk of the territory to 
Arab control, it contends, would virtually guarantee an 
attack. 
A look at Israeli-controlled territory will show 
the extent of its territorial expansion. In 1947-48 it 
occupied areas allotted to Arab Palestine, then in 1967 it 
took the Golan Heights and the West Bank and Gaza and Sinai 
Peninsula. Sinai was later given back in 1982. It marched 
into Lebanon and while withdrawing held and still holds 
South Lebanese territory either directly or through its 
proxy militia force the South Lebanon Army (SLA). Israel 
today has military superiority, chemical and nuclear 
capability, long-range missiles, sophisticated aircrafts, 
reconnaissance satellite, submarines, and enjoys a 
commanding strategic position with natural defence aid such 
as physical barriers (mountains, rivers, internal strategic 
depth to absorb and attack). It receives more than 
$ 3 billion a year in U.S. aid plus retains her strategic 
alliance and special relationship with the U.S. 
Israel annexed Jerusalem during the decade of 
1980's and destroyed the Iraqi reactor, annexed the Golan 
Heights, invaded Lebanon, shared complicity in the 
massacres of the Arab living in the Gaza Strip and Golan 
Heights, and bombed the P.L.O. headquarters in Tunisia. 
Israel's strength lies mainly in the military power and 
Arab disunity. Arab Unity is a direct threat to Israel 
that must be prevented, and regional instability as well as 
domestic turmoil serve Israel's immediate purposes. The 
Arab system is probably the most penetrated system in the 
world having largest degree of internecence quarrels. The 
Arab State system is distinctly multipolar. Several of the 
Arab State (Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia...) are important yet 
none appears to have the potential for exerting widely 
accepted leadership, let alone hegemony. There is no 
mutual cooperation among Arab States, no joint plants, no 
coordination, no clear and precise common views and even no 
normal diplomatic relations. There exist mutual suspi-
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cions, competing aspiration, different region types and 
historical rivalries (Syria versus Iraq and Egypt). This 
competition among the Arab countries and their mutual 
mistrust has considerably helped Israeli military strategy. 
It was however, the courage and devotion of the Israeli 
forces and enhanced Israeli security environment as well 
that helped to neutralize the- effect of greater Arab 
numbers. 
Saddam Hussain's conquest of Kuwait has sharpened 
the intra-Arab rivalries that have long thwarted hopes of 
forging a regional unity against Israel. The various Arab 
factions has condemned Israel's Seizure of Arab Lands in 
1967. Saddam Hussain had declared that he is ready to 
resolve the Gulf Crisis if Israel gives up those conquest. 
Yet the Arab State did not support Saddam Hussain in his 
linkage of both issues. 
In the Arab World, Security of the Regime 
(rulling elite) and not the national security appears to be 
more important. This is why one cannot find a national 
Security Council with in most of the Arab States. This is 
not so in Israel, where national security is more important 
and the concept of regime security does not exist. In the 
past, the Arabs tried to destroy their national security to 
keep the regime security and to hold power. 
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The U.S. has emerged as a key arbitrator in the 
future of Middle East politics and a single most powerful 
influence, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. 
This U.S. ascendancy can be traced to the Camp David break 
through of 1978. It has been demonstrated in the success-
ful completion of Egypt-Israel treaty. In the post Kuwait 
phase the U.S. has further strengthened its position in the 
region. Thus peace in the Middle East at this juncture of 
history cannot and will not be achieved without the active 
involvement of the U.S. 
The U.S. dealt with the Gulf Crisis and forced 
Iraq to pull out its troops from Kuwait. The U.S. can 
pressurize Israel to pull out from the Arab lands through 
impossing its will by with holding loans and cutting off 
aid. In the Arab perception the U.S. remains reluctant to 
push Israel beyond a certain point. The Arab perceive this 
U.S. reluctance as problematic, especially on the back-
drop of active Arab cooperation given to the U.S. in Kuwait 
crisis. 
The main concluding observations are as follows: 
1. Israelis do not expect their security problem to 
be solved overnight through some ingenious peace formulla. 
Some Israeli infact argue that the conflict preserves the 
Israeli national character and cohesiveness of the Israeli 
society. Thus to maintain an effective deterrent against 
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the Arabs, Israel wants absolute security and that appears 
impossible. 
2. The fate of Israel is linked to the" national 
security interest of the U.S. The U.S. continues to have 
sustained interest in Israel as a front line State and 
Strategic base in Middle East. This U.S. interest is a 
product of a variety of factors that can include a Jewish 
interest group pressure in domestic politics; the desire to 
use a non-Islamic ally in a predominantly Islamic world; a 
politically stable ally who has commonality of world views; 
etc. Israel, on the other hand, is likely to realize the 
limitations of this dependency relationship. Israel's 
efforts at expressing its independent identity anf^  forging 
a policy of relatively aggressive and self-reliant (and 
defiant) security posture is a telling example of this 
trend. One suspects that if at all the U.S. is forced to 
put pressure on Israel for concessions in the Middle East 
peace process, Israel would ensure that it extracts a price 
from the U.S. 
3. Israel has now emerged as a status quoist power, 
in particular after the collapse of Iraqi military machine. 
But the Status quo of Israeli security cannot be permanent, 
there is bound to be some change in the atmosphere. Time 
and the passage of year will not work to Israel's advantage 
for one reason; the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Arab 
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World; in particular in Algeria, Sudan and Jordan, In the 
long run the Arab World is likely to use the pressure of 
Islamic unity to put Israel on the defensive. 
4. The impasse at the attempts at peace have forced a 
few Arab States see a military option as the only solution 
in this troubled region. They maintained that peace will 
not be achieved through negotiations and war remained the 
only way to change the balance of power in the Middle East 
and to solve Arab-Israel conflict. 
5. "Land for peace" remains the only concrete direc-
tion in which the negotiations are likely to proceed. At 
one level this proposal may find acceptance in so far as 
the land of Syria (Golan Heights) and Lebanon is concerned. 
At another level some of this land has become problematic. 
The Jordanian West Bank and Egyptian Gaza are now a 
different issue as they have been laid claim to as 
Palestinian State. In case of West Bank: Jordan, has even 
conceded this right. The discussion on the issue is thus 
likely to stop short at Palestine. To the Arabs the only 
way to achieve peace in the area is the Israeli acceptance 
of Palestinian national self-determination in the West 
Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem in exchange for full Arab 
recognition of Israel and for certain security on the 
eastern front. In the event of the refusal of Israel to 
make concessions on the Palestine issue, Arabs fear a 
recurrence of conflict in the Middle East. 
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